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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
Agricultural producers have faced considerable price risk in recent 
years as a consequence of large variations in agricultural commodity 
prices. The risks associated with adverse price variability are 
especially intense for soybean growers. Farmers using the cash market at 
harvest have faced highly variable and frequently low returns as can be 
seen from Figures 1.1 and 1.2. For example, Northcentral Iowa soybean 
producers relying on the cash market at harvest time realized a nominal 
profit of $1.57 per bushel in 1983 but they faced nominal losses of $0.76 
per bushel in 1984 and $1.72 per bushel in 1985. The real returns, 
measured in 1982 dollars, show the same pattern as nominal returns for 
1983 through 1985 (Figure 1.2). The primary factor for this large shift 
in profits was drastic changes in soybean cash prices. From 1983 to 
1984, estimated average costs of production went up by about $0.12 per 
bushel while cash harvest time prices declined by about $2.0 per bushel. 
From 1984 to 1985, estimated average costs of production declined by 
about $0.15 per bushel while cash harvest prices declined by about $1.15 
per bushel. While these might be extreme cases, they exemplify recent 
increased risks of price variability for soybean producers who rely 
solely on the harvest time cash market for the pricing of their output. 
Figure 1.3 shows the recent variability in soybean cash prices. 
Soybean prices fluctuated between a high of $9.40 per bushel and a low of 
$4.30 per bushel during the 1975-85 decade. As a result of the wide 
Figure 1.1. Annual nominal returns from selling crops at harvest in Northcentral Iowa 
cash markets, 1975 through 1985 
Figure 1.2. Annual real returns (in 1982 prices) from selling crops at harvest in 
Northcentral Iowa cash markets, 1975 through 1985 
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Figure 1.3. Northcentral Iowa cash soybean prices, 1975 through 1985 
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price fluctuations, soybean producers relying on the harvest time cash 
market realized volatile returns over this 11-year period. Crop 
producers have available alternative pricing mechanisms, including 
forward contracts, futures markets, and more recently options markets. 
Soybean producers may be able to secure improved output prices through 
selective use of these marketing alternatives. However, these 
alternative markets have not been utilized to a large extent by 
producers. Farmers have been skeptical and reluctant to use commodity 
futures (and options) in their marketing plans. In a 1975 survey of 
Midwest farmers, Meyer (1976) reported that 83 percent of the respondents 
never hedged, 11 percent had speculated in the futures markets, and only 
two percent hedged on any regular basis. The primary reasons cited for 
farmers' nonparticipation in futures markets include lack of information, 
misconceptions, and lack of size of operation to fulfill fixed quantity 
contract specifications. Zielim (1986) surveyed students in two 
agricultural economics courses at Iowa State University. Of the students 
surveyed, only 12 percent claimed their family farm operation had used 
futures markets. A large percentage of the individuals surveyed (49 
percent) reported that an important reason for not using the futures 
market was because the futures market was too risky. This seems to 
support the argument that inadequate knowledge of the futures market or 
of the risks of marketing only in the cash market has been a key factor 
for nonuse. 
In addition to low levels of hedging by producers, the overall 
volume of trading in the soybean futures market has fluctuated 
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dramatically in recent years. The annual trading volume in the Chicago 
Board of Trade soybean futures market and options on the soybean futures 
market since 1975 are shown in Table 1.1. The volume of trading in the 
soybean futures market was at an all time high in 1983 with more than 
68,000 contracts traded which was about four times the 1975 annual volume 
and twice the 1977 volume. Thus, a rapid increase in the volume of 
trading in the soybean futures market (with the exceptions of 1982 and 
1984 through 1986) has occurred over the last decade. Although much of 
this trading volume is attributed to speculators, the large volume has 
Table 1.1. Trading volume (in thousands of bushels) in soybean futures 
and options on soybean futures by contract, 1975-1986^' 
Options on 
soybean futures 
Year Soybeans contracts^ 
1975 19,567 
1976 27,371 
1977 39,981 
1978 42,386 
1979 45,572 
1980 58,841 
1981 52,450 
1982 45,828 
1983 68,402 
1984 56,815 365 
1985 36,960 4,205 
1986 30,670 3,875 
*One Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) soybean futures contract is 
5,000 bushels. 
^Source: Chicago Board of Trade, Annual Statistics. 
^Soybean options have only been traded since November 1984. 
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helped keep the soybean futures market liquid. The decreased volume in 
the soybean futures market in recent years could be due mainly to the 
decline in U.S. exports which increased the carryover stocks relative to 
earlier years, had a dampening effect on soybean price movements and, 
hence, caused a less volatile market and less volume of trading in the 
futures market. The volume of trading in options on soybean futures has 
been low, perhaps due to the newness of the soybean options market. 
Soybean producers who can ill afford large losses from selling in 
cash market need alternative market strategies that can help to reduce 
the large losses associated with highly volatile returns. Government 
price support programs have reduced the variability of prices, but they 
have fallen short of providing adequate risk reduction protection. If 
properly used, hedging in futures markets may be one of the best ways to 
reduce the risk of price and return variability, but as discussed above 
it is used by a very small percentage of producers. With the inception 
of trading in options on agricultural commodities futures contracts in 
the last two years, an additional risk management tool became available. 
Producers need to have more information on the potential uses of and 
likely results from using commodity options and futures contracts in 
their marketing plans. Few studies have documented historically how 
main-crop farmers would have fared using various options and/or futures 
strategies. Producers need to have an idea of the expected risk/return 
tradeoffs certain market positions may offer. The general purpose of 
this study is to partially remedy this situation. 
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Objectives 
1. Estimate optimal hedge ratios for farmers under different sets 
of objectives. This will help the farmer to determine what size of 
futures position needs to be taken to offset price risk on current and/or 
anticipated cash position. 
2. Estimate option premiums for the 1975-1984 period using a 
variation of the options pricing model developed by Cox, Ross, and 
Rubenstein (1979). This pricing model has the advantage of capturing the 
effects of government loan rates (price supports) on option premiums. 
3. Develop easily understood and easily implemented routine and 
selective hedging and option strategies and simulate their respective 
risk-return distributions for typical Northcentral Iowa farmers over the 
period 1975-1985. 
4. Compare and rank marketing strategies by both mean-variance and 
mean-semi-variance approaches. The ranking will be done both in terms of 
current dollars and constant 1982 dollars. 
Organization 
This study is organized as follows; Chapter 2 contains a comprehen­
sive review of various studies of hedging strategies, with particular 
focus on grain and soybean hedging strategies. A review of the few 
studies incorporating options into the grain marketing decision process 
is also provided. Chapter 3 contains; 1) theories of hedging, 
2) derivation of optimal hedging ratio(s), and 3) discussion of empirical 
estimation results of optimal hedge ratios to be used in simulation of 
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some of the strategies. Chapter 4 considers the commodity option pricing 
method to be used in subsequent marketing strategy simulations and 
includes; 1) a theoretical literature review, 2) an outline and 
discussion of the option pricing model used to estimate option premiums 
prior to the existence of the present option trading market on soybeans, 
and 3) a discussion of the empirical issues involved in estimating option 
premiums. In Chapter 5, 1) various routine and hedging strategies using 
cash, futures and options are developed, 2) simulation procedures are 
developed to test the historical performance of various alternative 
strategies for typical Northcentral soybean farmers over the 1975 through 
1985 period, and 3) simulation results of various strategies are compared 
and ranked using mean-variance and semi-variance analysis. Chapter 6 
provides a summary of the results and conclusions of the study. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Hedging Strategies 
The following section provides a chronological review of the 
relevant literature on the effectiveness of various cash and hedging 
strategies available to main-crop producers and/or livestock producers. 
Heifner (1966) used quadratic programming to select combinations of 
grain storage activities and futures trading activities that minimize 
revenue variance for various levels of expected storage revenue. 
Solutions were presented for combinations of up to 20 activities 
involving the storage of three different grains in Michigan. The 
solutions illustrated that unhedged seasonal grain inventories and 
nondiversified inventories are inefficient relative to fully hedged 
diversified inventories. 
Tomek and Gray (1970) talk about two important functions performed 
by futures markets — guidance of inventory levels and establishment of 
forward prices. They argue that because historically futures markets 
first emerged for the annual crops that could be continuously stored 
(grain and cotton), inventory hedging has been important from the outset. 
But forward pricing which was not attendant upon inventories has long 
been practiced, and emergence of futures markets for noninventory 
commodities dramatizes this fact. They show that the model of inter­
temporal price relationships differs for the two cases and provides 
evidence for selected commodities. They also argue that the forward-
pricing function of futures markets can help stabilize production. In 
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addition, since the behavior of futures prices varies from commodity to 
commodity, it cannot' be taken for granted that producer hedging 
stabilizes revenue. They argue and conclude that, given a viable futures 
market, a routine hedging program does not necessarily reduce the 
variance of revenue of the producer-hedger. However, the introduction of 
a futures market into a situation in which one did not previously exist 
may reduce variability of prices if the market becomes viable. Intra-
seasonal and, perhaps, inter-seasonal prices are stabilized by futures 
trade for continuous inventory commodities. They continue by stating 
that the difference between cash and futures prices provides the 
incentive or disincentive to store or stimulates changes in production 
plans. The difference depends on both prices and they show that nearer 
prices are closely related to the more distant prices in inventory-
hedging markets. They also conclude that the gains in stability to a 
producer-hedging program, while minimal for continuously stored 
commodities, may be substantial for other commodities (such as 
potatoes). 
Gum and Wildermuth (1970) investigate hedging on the live cattle 
futures contract and argue that feeders who are considering use of the 
Chicago live cattle futures contract as a means of reducing produce price 
risks must consider more than just the price for which they sell a 
futures contract. They must consider both the efficiency of the hedge 
and expected effective price which results from hedging. This is shown 
by selected comparison of results for fed cattle marketed in Chicago, 
Phoenix, and Denver, May 1965-December 1968. 
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^ Ward and Fletcher (1971) present a theoretical model of optimal firm 
decisions in cash and futures markets that includes both primary product 
producers and marketing firms. The generalized model of production and 
marketing decisions under risk is applied to both short and long hedging 
and speculation. Comparisons between hedging on futures markets and 
forward contracting are made. Live beef futures are used to show how 
transformation costs for nonstorable commodities should be treated in the 
same manner as storage costs for storable commodities. They develop a 
futures model based on a set of price expectations, a probability 
distribution for this set, and a preference function for risk diversion. 
Within this framework, optimal futures and cash market positions are 
established for producers and marketing agencies. For the primary 
producer buying feeder cattle, the optimal cash market position was 
derived simultaneously with the optimal futures position. Processors, 
dealers, and other marketing agencies can utilize futures as hedges 
against contracted and anticipated purchases of live animals. The ratio 
of futures to cash positions could be a) less than one (less than 100 
percent hedging), b) equal to one (100 percent hedging), or c) greater 
than one (hedging and speculation). In addition, cash market partici­
pants can be pure speculators when their expectations warrant such 
positions. Hedges in both the input and output markets require two 
distinct futures markets. The processor can hedge inputs through live 
beef futures, but his output would have to be hedged in a futures market 
for beef carcasses, A beef feeder who completely hedges both his inputs 
and his outputs and has expectations of zero gain or loss in the futures 
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market could be compared to a feedlot operator feeding cattle on 
contract. Both sell a service at a fixed price. Both give up the 
possibility of higher income to avoid risk. 
Holland, Purcell, and Hague (1972) evaluate the performance of 
alternative hedging strategies for cattle feeding operations. Estimates 
of the mean and the variance of net returns for selected strategies are 
developed and have been used as criteria for evaluating alternative 
hedging strategies for cattle feeding operations. While no particular 
strategy is recommended, the analysis does indicate which of the 
strategies are efficient. In comparison to a completely unhedged 
operation, the strategy of hedging all cattle results in a significant 
reduction in variance of net return but at the cost of a large and 
statistically significant reduction in the mean of net return. A 
seasonal hedging operation with correction for price change gave the best 
mean returns by take advantage of the seasonal movements. However, the 
variance was higher than for any of the strategies employing hedging and 
was not significantly smaller than the variance of the unhedged feeding 
strategy. The strategy of hedging if expected lock-in is greater than or 
equal to the mean net return performed well. Even though establishing an 
accurate expected lock-in market proved to be difficult because of 
considerable variation in the basis, this strategy accomplished a 
significant decrease in variance of net returns and a small increase in 
mean net returns compared to the unhedged feeding strategy. The strategy 
of hedging if expected net revenue is less than the mean net return and 
expected lock-in is greater than zero was not without problems but 
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appeared to contain information that could be used to advantage. The 
difficulty with this strategy was that current prices projected into the 
future on the basis of a seasonal index generally failed to account for 
the magnitude of price change that often took place. In general, it 
appears that strategies involving hedging can be used successfully by the 
manager of cattle feeding operations. Results of this analysis suggest 
strategies are available which not only decrease the variability of net 
returns (which is expected) but also increase the mean net returns (which 
is not usually expected). 
Scheer (1973), in a study of the pricing strategies for hog 
producers, found that profitability could be increased and risk reduced 
by utilizing the futures market. He found the variability of the basis 
to be much greater in noncontract months than in contract months where 
the contract month is the month in which a futures contract becomes 
deliverable. Thus, he concluded that hedging strategies that terminate 
in noncontract months may be lacking in relative performance when these 
are compared to strategies under which contracts are held until delivery 
months. 
Heifner (1973) has analyzed the potential for shifting risk through 
hedging in commodity futures for selected grain storage and livestock 
feeding situations. Results applied to various locations, grades, and/or 
classes have been reported for wheat, corn, oats, cattle, and hogs. 
Hedging potential is measured in terms of risk-shifting effectiveness — 
the proportional reduction in the variance of profits that can be 
obtained through routine hedging. The study indicates that hedging in 
15 
commodity futures offers typical agricultural producers and marketers 
opportunities to shift one-third to two-thirds of their price risks on 
grain storage and livestock feeding operations. For most of the 
situations studied, risk is minimized by holding 0.6 to 1.0 units of 
short futures for each unit of cash commodity intended for sale. Price 
risks can be shifted through hedging almost as effectively in livestock 
feeding as in grain storage. Hedging effectiveness tends to decline as 
distance from the par delivery point for the futures contract increases. 
Hedging effectiveness differs between classes of wheat and among the 
three wheat futures markets. Grade has little impact on hedging 
effectiveness in cattle feeding, however. Optimal hedging levels (where 
the optimal hedge is the level of futures position relative to the cash 
position that results in the best attainable combination of average 
profit and risk for a particular individual or firm) for individual firms 
are shown to be very sensitive to the firm's price expectations. The 
author concludes that the finding that overall price risk is often 
minimized by holding less than 1.0 units of futures for each unit of cash 
contrasts with frequently used hedging illustrations showing futures and 
cash positions of the same absolute size. Setting the futures position 
equal to the cash position minimizes risk if profits from the two 
positions are equally variable and perfectly correlated. When the 
correlation is imperfect, risk will normally be minimized by holding a 
smaller position in futures than in cash commodity. 
Leuthold (1975) analyzes the actual and potential use of the 
livestock futures market by Illinois producers. The author argues that 
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producers can reduce the risk of price level changes in their feeding 
stock by hedging with futures contracts and they also can hold livestock 
contracts for speculation purposes regardless of their position in the 
cash market. Eleven strategies for hedging on the cattle futures market, 
ranging from no hedging to total hedging, were developed and applied to 
simulated Illinois cattle feeding operations over the period from 1965 
through 1974. With each strategy, the mean returns and variance of these 
returns were computed. The author found that in nearly every farm plan, 
four selective strategies increased incomes and reduced risks relative to 
a cash-only strategy. These four strategies were; 1) hedge only if the 
calculated breakeven price is less than the price of the futures contract 
that is to be used for the hedge, 2) hedge only if the breakeven price 
plus $0.5 per hundred weight is less than the futures price, 3) hedge 
only if the present cash price is less than the appropriate futures price 
at the beginning of the feeding period, and 4) hedge only if the cash 
price plus $1.00 per hundred weight is less than the futures price. Of 
these four, strategies 2 and 4 generally produced the most favorable 
results. All other strategies reduced both mean returns and risk 
relative to the cash operation, making them undesirable relative to the 
above four strategies. In particular, any strategy requiring hedging 
when marketing in certain latter months of the year had inferior results. 
Hence, the author concludes that hedging reduces risks relative to the 
cash operation and in some cases increases income, but the total hedging 
strategy (full hedge) is undesirable in that the income foregone is too 
high relative to the amount of risk reduction. The author suggests that 
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selective strategies involving breakeven futures price relationship 
should be followed. 
Erickson (1978) did a study on selective hedging strategies for 
cattle feeders. Several selective hedging strategies were outlined which 
were hypothesized to stabilize income and increase net returns. 
Comparisons utilizing average returns and variance of returns were 
evaluated for hedging and cash marketing. The author found that routine 
hedging is not a viable alternative for any group of producers intent on 
maximizing profit, and the cash strategy offers producers higher average 
returns above variable costs but is extremely variable. The study 
illustrates that reliable hedging criteria should be based on some 
futures-cash or futures breakeven price relationship. (Notice that this 
conclusion is similar to the conclusion in Leuthold (1975) reviewed 
earlier.) The results of this study indicate that producers who are 
above average in the size of their operation and who possess marketing 
and feeding efficiencies may use hedging most effectively. An important 
conclusion of this study is that the futures market is a legitimate 
marketing tool available to cattle producers — one offering many 
advantages that cash marketing cannot. 
Heifner (1978) studied minimum risk preharvest sales of soybeans. 
He modified the formula by McKinnon for determining minimum risk, forward 
selling levels for crop producers operating under yield risk so that 
basis risk can also be taken into account. Example results are presented 
for soybeans in non-corn-belt counties using both the modified McKinnon 
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method and an alternative method involving the direct minimization of 
variance of return. 
Shafer, Griffin, and Johnston (1978) present evidence from the 47 
feed-out periods spanning from March 1972 through June 1976 that gives 
strong support to the use of futures markets for selective hedging in 
cattle feeding. Routine cattle hedging was not evaluated by the authors 
because they conclude that previous studies have shown it to be 
inappropriate, e.g., locking in losses. Feeding only when an acceptable 
return per head was expected during the two-month planning period based 
on simultaneous corn and long feeder cattle hedges and short fat cattle 
hedges was found to be the most conservative strategy. The second most 
profitable strategy involved locking-in acceptable returns during the 
two-month planning period if possible; if not, feeding with the hope of 
hedging an acceptable return sometime within the feed-out period 
(otherwise selling in the cash market). Technical trading was the most 
profitable of the hedging strategies, although its variance was large, 
where technical trading was defined as being 10-15 day moving averages 
for indicating opportune times for placing and lifting live cattle 
hedges. Hedging through the use of futures contracts did not lock-in any 
profits. The authors found locking in would be successful only if the 
difference (or basis) between cash prices and futures prices could be 
fully anticipated. Because this difference varies, a hedger is subject 
to basis risk. However, the authors illustrated in the 47 simulated 
feedouts that basis risk was less than price risk and, thus, an 
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appropriate selective hedging strategy can probably reduce price risk in 
cattle feeding. 
Leuthold and Mokler (1980) investigate the questions of how 
sensitive are the futures market prices for major products in the 
livestock-feed grain sector in producer margins, and can producers use 
these futures markets to improve profit potentials and manage risks? 
They simulated a cattle feedlot typical of the Midwest and examined 234 
feeding periods during 1972-1976. Futures prices were checked daily, 
beginning three months prior to the commencement of feeding, for the 
possibility of establishing a profitable feeding margin with a three-way 
hedge (the simultaneous long hedging of feeder cattle and corn, and short 
hedging of fat cattle). If a profitable margin of a given size failed to 
appear prior to feeding, feeder cattle and corn were cash purchased and 
the search continued for a profitable feeding margin to establish a short 
live cattle hedge. The results in their paper demonstrate that selective 
use of the futures market by cattle feeders has a high pay off.and 
complete avoidance of using any risk-management device is very costly. 
They have shown that application of a straightforward hedging strategy 
enhances profits considerably along with reducing risks. 
Paul, Kahl, and Tomek (1981) simulated routine hedging programs 
using historical prices to explore the usefulness of the New York 
Mercantile Exchange potato futures contract as a hedging tool. They 
compared hedging and nonhedging programs in terms of average returns and 
standard deviations of returns realized by the Maine potato storer in 
1952-1972 and 1973-1978. Their results indicate that storage hedges in 
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Maine appear to have been more effective in reducing variability of 
returns the longer the duration of the hedge. They concluded that 
although the above phenomenon occurred both before and after 1973, it may 
have cost more to reduce variability in terms of decreasing average 
returns after 1973. Thus, the potato futures market appears to have 
become less effective in recent years for hedging risk of price changes 
during the storage period. 
Caldwell, Copeland, and Hawkins (1982) examine the feasibility of a 
Canadian producer using the U.S. futures market to hedge specific 
products. They define multihedging as a situation where a producer uses 
several hedges to hedge both inputs and outputs and in doing so locks in 
a profit margin on his operation. In particular, their paper examines 
the feasibility of hedging two inputs (barley and feeder cattle) and one 
output (fat cattle). The Chicago Board of Trade corn contract is used to 
hedge barley, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange feeder cattle contract to 
hedge feeder cattle, and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange live cattle 
contract to hedge fat cattle. These hedges are evaluated in terms of the 
level of returns to the producer. They simulate the following strategies 
and report the mean variance of returns. Strategy 1: no hedging. This 
strategy was used to obtain a standard with which to evaluate the other 
hedging strategies. Strategy 2: routine hedging. Strategy 3; hedge 
feeder cattle only. Strategy 4: hedge barley only. Strategy 5: hedge 
finished cattle only. Strategy 6: hedge finished cattle when the 
current futures price is greater than or equal to the current cash price. 
Strategy 7: hedge finished cattle when the current basis is less than 
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the mean of the basis. Strategy 8: hedge finished cattle when the 
current basis is less the mean of the basis minus one standard deviation. 
The authors conclude that over the period of September 1975 to January 
1978 an Alberta operator (Canadian operator) could increase his income 
level, but in doing so he would incur a greater degree of instability. 
In particular, the employment of strategy 3 would have increased income 
by $12.97 per head. In doing so, the degree of instability as measured 
by the standard deviation increased from $29.83 per head to $58.53 per 
head. They also found that certain contracts offer greater potential for 
hedging. In particular, the hedging of feeder cattle and barley produced 
significantly higher levels of producer income. The hedging of finished 
cattle with the Chicago live cattle contract, however, is highly 
unpredictable and therefore should be approached with caution by any 
producer contemplating its use. Another conclusion of this study is that 
basis tends to be relatively constant for feeder cattle and barley in the 
closing weeks of the contract. Also, they found that certain strategies 
offered greater potential for hedging than others. In particular, 
strategy 1 has been found to be superior (i.e., higher average return and 
lower variance of return) to strategies 2, 4, 5, and 6. Strategies 3, 7, 
and 8 could not be evaluated in terms of their superiority over strategy 
1. Strategies 3 and 8 were superior, however, to strategy 7 (i.e., they 
either had higher average returns and lower variances or vice versa). 
The authors concluded that despite these indications, the ultimate 
decision lies with the individual producer's evaluation of returns versus 
risk. 
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Wilson (1984) analyzed hedging effectiveness of U.S. wheat futures 
markets. He argued that hedging performance of the futures markets is 
particularly important in the case of wheat. Five grades of wheat exist, 
each with many different quality characteristics. These can be hedged on 
any of three futures markets, each with different deliverable grades but 
affected by the same fundamental factors. In addition, it is possible 
for traders to place hedges in more than one futures market. The author 
compared the ex-post hedging effectiveness of the three wheat futures 
markets in reducing risk of three classes of wheat with different protein 
levels. Risk minimizing hedge ratios (due to Johnson (1960) and Stein 
(1961)) and measures of the effectiveness of hedging were calculated 
ex-post for each of the eight qualities of cash wheat hedged at each of 
the three futures markets. Weekly data was used from the period 1977-
1981. The results of the analysis for hedges placed in a single futures 
market indicated that hedging generally offers greater risk protection. 
The author found that cross-hedging becomes relatively more viable in 
longer-term hedges. The results also indicated that greater risk 
protection is attained if the hedges are placed in nearby contracts 
rather in distant contracts. The risk-minimizing hedge ratios were 
generally less than one and in most cases studied were significantly less 
than one. The author concluded that these results indicate that cash 
position should be only partially hedged if the objective is to minimize 
risk, as opposed to having equal and opposite positions as in traditional 
hedging. It was also found that risk reduction is enhanced in many cases 
by spreading hedges across two futures markets. For example, a short 
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cash position could be offset by long positions in more than one wheat 
futures contract. 
Davis and Franzmann (1985) examined the hedging effectiveness.of 
live cattle futures for cattle feeders during the 1976-1980 period. They 
tested the use of moving averages to determine when to place a hedge and 
found that many strategies decreased the variability of returns relative 
to a cash-only strategy. A tradeoff existed between the mean and 
variance of returns for lifting and replacing hedges during the period as 
signaled by the moving averages as opposed to placing and holding a hedge 
when signaled for the entire period. Holding the hedge until the sell 
date was found to decrease variability of returns and decrease their 
average level. 
Ziehm (1986) evaluated a number of hedging strategies for cattle 
feeders using live cattle futures. The returns of typical Iowa cattle 
feeders using various strategies were simulated for 1974-1984 (assuming 
quarterly placements). The strategies tested included: 1) a cash only 
strategy, 2) a routine hedge, i.e., placing a short hedge in live cattle 
futures on the first day of the assumed placement month, 3) hedge if the 
current live cattle cash price was less than the localized delivery month 
futures price, 4) hedge if (3) was true and also the localized futures 
price was greater than the expected breakeven price, 5) hedge if an 
expected profit margin could be locked in using thresholds from $1.00/cwt 
to $9.00/cwt with single dollar increments to signal hedges, 6) using a 
scale-up strategy in conjunction with strategy (5) where some fixed 
percentage (he chose to evaluate 25, 33, and 50 percent) of the cattle 
24 
were hedged (up to 100 percent) as the expected profitability of the 
hedge increased by $1.00/cwt, and 7) hedge if the localized futures 
price was greater than or equal to the Iowa State extension price 
forecast. He evaluated these strategies for three different hedging 
horizons; 1) beginning two months prior to placement and continuing 
through the feeding period, 2) beginning at placement and continuing 
through the feeding period, and 3) in the placement month only. In 
general, the cash only strategy exhibited the highest variance of returns 
and was near the lowest average return as well. The routine hedge 
strategy exhibited the lowest variance but also a very low average return 
relative to the other strategies. The scale-up profit threshold 
strategies resulted in the highest return up to the $4.00/cwt level above 
which returns began to drop due to the infrequency of hedging signals. 
Drinka and Rogers (1985) and Rogers and Drinka et al. (1985) have 
tested a number of preharvest and postharvest hedging strategies for 
Illinois corn producers. They indicated mixed empirical results with 
some of the selective strategies based on cost of production showing a 
higher probability of success than others. 
Options Strategies 
The studies discussed so far have included only strategies involved 
in evaluation of hedging in the futures market. No analysis was included 
in evaluating the use of commodity options. Only a few recent studies 
have considered use of commodity options. These studies are as follows: 
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Gardner (1977) considered the potential benefits of trading in 
options for farm commodities in three areas: risk management by 
individuals, the functioning of commodity markets, and the management of 
public policy with respect to farm products. He argues that hedging 
using futures contracts provides a standard with which risk management by 
means of commodity options may be compared. The essential difference is 
that while futures ideally determine price in advance for a hedger, an 
option fixes price over a range of market outcomes while confronting the 
individual with the market price over a different range. The author 
presents an example of put option hedging by a product and argues that 
whether hedging with put options is preferred to a forward sale would 
depend on the producer's utility function. The option would have appeal, 
for example, to a farmer having a utility function of the form suggested 
by Friedman and Savage to account for simultaneous insurance and 
gambling, i.e., risk aversion in the face of large losses but risk 
preference in choice between average and unusually large gains. He 
argues that even if a producer is uniformly averse to risk, options are 
promising in risk management when one moves away from the idealized 
circumstances in which a future sale determines returns per bushel in 
advance. In addition, in more realistic cases in which output is 
stochastic or when basis risk exists, futures are less effective in 
reducing risk. McKinnon (1967) and Peck (1975) have analyzed variance of 
receipts in some such cases mentioned above. In the circumstances that 
McKinnon analyzes, where a farmer's output is negatively correlated to 
price, options can duplicate and even improve upon the stabilization of 
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receipts attained by a forward sale. Gardner then illustrates a 
hypothetical situation in which a producer of crops faces five 
possibilities for market demand and his yield, each with an equal 
probability. Then he illustrates producer outcomes under the following 
futures and option hedging strategies; full hedge (sell forward his 
entire normal crop), optimal forward sale (where optimal forward sale is 
a fraction of expected production and McKinnon (1967) has calculated the 
formula), optimal forward sale plus purchase of a call, and writing a 
call option and simultaneously buying a put option. Generally, his last 
two strategies which involve options perform favorably compared to 
optimal forward sale strategies. The author concludes that the effects 
of options trading in farm commodities cannot be established other than 
hypothetically since there is so little empirical evidence. Nonetheless, 
the point is to show that options have promise for limiting price risk 
with more flexibility than futures allow. 
Catlett (1980) and Catlett and Boehlje (1982) examine whether 
commodity options are viable substitutes for traditional futures hedges 
for live cattle. Selected strategies for futures and option hedges are 
simulated with gross mean returns, variance, risk premiums, and risk 
differentials reported. The following strategies were simulated; 1) a 
full future hedge, 2) beginning basis of $1.50 per hundred weight or 
more, 3) beginning basis of $1.00 per hundred weight or more, 4) delivery 
month hedge, and 5) nondelivery month hedge. For each of these five 
strategies, two option strategies have been used. The first option 
strategy allows the option to expire and never be exercised. The second 
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option strategy lets the option expire if a loss would be realized by 
exercising, but the option is exercised if a return above transaction 
costs could be realized. The live cattle futures contract as traded on 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange was used as the basic contract. Put 
options were used with premium values set at 5, 10, and 15 percent of the 
strike price. The period used for analysis was 1965-1977 and a 
representative raidwestern cattle feeder was assumed for the simulations. 
The results of the simulations revealed that in terms of gross mean 
returns all of the option hedges are lower than futures hedges with the 
exception of the nondelivery and delivery month strategies for the second 
option strategy with a five percent premium. In other words, 94 percent 
of the option hedges produced lower gross mean returns than futures 
hedges. Also, all but seven of the option hedges (80 percent) had lower 
variances than futures hedges. They argue that the right but not the 
obligation that options possess is purchasable for a premium and for that 
premium the hedger shifts a portion of his risk to the option seller. 
Thus, option hedges should produce lower gross mean returns with lower 
variances. Using the full futures hedge as the comparison point and 
assuming a risk averse individual, the authors conclude that options can 
be used as a hedging substitute. 
Nichols (1984) did a study of alternative marketing strategies for 
soybean producers that involved cash sales, futures market contracts, and 
options contracts. He found that selective strategies based on cost of 
production yielded higher mean net return and lower variance of net 
returns compared to the cash market. Pre-harvest put ôptions strategies 
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performed quite well in reducing the variance of net returns when 
compared with the cash market. Results from the post-harvest marketing 
• strategies involving futures and options indicated trade off between net 
returns and risks. Storing beans at harvest, buying March at-the-money 
puts and selling beans in March resulted in the largest negative net 
return of any strategy. Nichols, in simulating options premiums, did not 
use an option pricing model. Rather, he just assumed that the options 
premium would be eight percent of the price of a futures contract. 
Hudson, Hauser, and Fortenbery (1985) simulated price risk 
management strategies over the period from January 1974 through December 
1982 for commercial cattle feeders. Closing futures prices for each 
contract month were used. Cash prices used were weekly averages of 
Central Illinois quotas. Option prices were estimated with Black's 
formula, using the historical variance calculated with futures prices 
over the previous AO trading days and a constant annualized interest rate 
of ten percent. The five marketing strategies simulated were: cash 
market, routine hedge, routine put, moving average hedge, and moving 
average put option. Stochastic dominance, which allows the ordering of 
uncertain choices for decision makers whose absolute risk aversion lies 
within specified upper and lower bounds, was used for comparison and 
ranking of different strategies. They concluded that with regard to 
futures strategies; a) routine hedging strategies reduce the variance of 
returns but also reduce mean return levels, and b) moving average hedging 
strategies can provide significantly higher mean returns while not 
markedly increasing their variability. They also found that routine put 
29 
option purchases provide a similar mean return to the cash market 
strategy but increased the variance considerably, so put options should 
be used selectively. Stochastic dominance results suggested that put 
options are preferred by some risk prone individuals. 
Falatoonzadeh et al. (1985) did a comprehensive study on risk 
management strategies to reduce net income variability for Texas cotton 
farmers. They developed a model under price and production uncertainty, 
and incorporated crop diversification, futures markets, forward pricing 
markets, cotton seller's call options, and the Federal Crop Insurance 
Program as risk management tools into the model. The model was tested 
using quadratic programming. Results demonstrated that farmers can 
reduce production and price risks when a combination strategy including a 
diversified crop production plan and participation in the futures market 
and the Federal Crop Insurance Program is implemented. 
Frank et al. (1986) used a variation of a target deviation model to 
examine the returns and risk of soybean marketing strategic: for Nebraska 
farmers using futures and options. The Black model was used to simulate 
put options premiums from 1978 through 1983. They found that adding 
options strategies to traditional cash sales, futures hedging, and 
storage hedging activities substantially improves risk-return tradeoffs. 
They also found that adding technical futures hedging (moving averages) 
strategies to options hedging strategies further improves risk-return 
tradeoffs. 
A paper by Eberle, Harrel, and Solverson (1986) reports the results 
of a number of soybean marketing strategies for Southern Illinois 
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producers involving the use of cash, futures, and options contracts. 
However, none of their simulations involve post-harvest sales of 
soybeans and for the estimation of options prices they employ the Black 
model. Since their simulation period ends with 1983, they employ no 
actual option premium data. 
Hauser and Bales (1986a, 1986b), and Hauser and Anderson (1987) 
developed a target-deviation model to explain the expected risk and 
return of some options strategies for soybean producers. Their main 
conclusion is that regardless of option strategy, as return increases 
risk increases too. While empirical, these research efforts do not 
contrast strategies involving option contracts with those involving 
futures contracts and cash sales. Furthermore, Hauser et al. employ the 
Black options pricing model which has a disadvantage to the Cox, Ross, 
and Rubenstein (1979) model for pricing agricultural options when the 
price of the underlying commodity is partially protected by government 
price supports. 
In summary, of hedging literature reviewed only studies by Heifner 
(1966, 1973, 1978), Tomek and Gray (1970), Drinka and Rogers (1985), and 
Rogers and Drinka et al. (1986) have developed some routine and selective 
strategies for mainrcrop producers and have attempted to empirically test 
the returns to those strategies. The rest of the hedging studies 
reviewed were concerned with strategies for livestock producers. The few 
hedging studies for main-crop farmers found the routine hedging 
strategies generally reduced the variability and average returns relative 
to the cash market. Some selective strategies reduced variability of 
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returns and increased #ean returns. Of options studies reviewed, only 
very few deal with crop option strategies and the methods employed have 
varied so widely that the results are not conclusive. This study tries 
to partially remedy the above situation. 
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CHAPTER 3. THE THEORY OF HEDGING, DERIVATION, 
AND ESTIMATION OF THE OPTIMAL HEDGE RATIO 
The main purpose of this chapter is to derive and estimate "optimal 
hedge" ratios for farmers with an existing or anticipated cash position. 
These estimates are then used (in Chapter 5) in determining the 
risk-return distribution of some of the hedging strategies. 
Hedging Theory 
Following Ederington's (1979) article, three theories of hedging can 
be distinguished. The first theory is that of traditional hedging in 
which the emphasis is on the pure risk-avoidance potential of the futures 
market. It was argued that hedgers would take a position in the futures 
market equal to, but opposite of, their position in the cash market. 
Thus, the hedger would hedge a cash position with a futures position of 
equal magnitude but of opposite sign. Traditional hedging theory 
arguments were based on the assumption that cash and futures instruments' 
prices generally move together; thus, the gain or loss on the hedged 
position would be less than for an unhedged position. If the change in 
basis is zero, the hedge is perfect. It is normally assumed that the 
variance, a measure of risk, for changes in the basis is less than the 
variance of price changes. Consequently, risk is reduced by hedging. 
The theme of this theory is that the hedge ratio, the proportion of the 
^The hedge ratio determines the futures position of hedgers to 
offset the price risk on his/her current or anticipated cash position. 
Optimality of this ratio depends on the underlying objective function of 
the hedger and will be discussed in the next sections. 
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cash position hedged, is one. The second theory of hedging, referred to 
as Working's hypothesis, questions the motivation of pure risk 
minimization of hedgers. He argued that hedging was undertaken primarily 
to maximize profits. Hedgers were viewed as taking positions in the 
futures market depending on their expectations of changes in cash-futures 
relationships. Working (1953) suggested that hedgers function like 
speculators, but their concern is primarily in relative prices rather 
than absolute prices. In other words, hedgers speculate on basis changes 
rather than changes in price levels.^ Thus, a holder of a long cash 
position (like a farmer whose crop is still in the field) would hedge by 
selling futures contracts only if the basis was expected to narrow 
(hence, his return to go up) and would not hedge if the basis was 
expected to widen (hence, his return to go down). 
The third theory of hedging is due primarily to Johnson (1960) and 
Stein (1961). They applied basic portfolio theory to the theory of 
hedging. This application resulted in incorporating the risk 
minimization of the traditional hedging theory and maximization of 
expected profit theory of hedging developed by Working into a unified 
theory of hedging. Johnson and Stein explain theoretically why some 
hedgers may not be fully hedged. Risk of price changes is introduced 
into the hedging model in a variance function and a frontier is traced 
showing a relationship between variance (risk) and expected returns. 
^The difference between the futures price and spot (cash) price is 
the basis. If futures prices and spot prices move together, the basis 
will be stable. If they do not move together, the basis is said to be 
variable. When futures and spot prices do not move together over the 
life of the hedge, the hedger is said to be exposed to "basis risk." 
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Hedgers select the proportion of their cash position which is hedged 
according to their indifference between risk and expected returns. It is 
theoretically possible for the optimal hedge ratio to be equal to, less 
than, or greater than one. The size of the position in the spot (cash) 
market can be viewed as fixed and the hedger's decision is to determine 
the proportion of the spot (cash) position that should be hedged. 
Derivation of the Optimal Hedge Ratio 
When placing a hedge, the hedger must determine the futures position 
to take to offset the price risk on his current or anticipated cash 
position. Following traditional hedging theory, when direct hedges are 
placed (e.g., soybean cash position hedged in soybean futures, etc.) one 
expects the proportion of the cash position hedged to be one. However, 
in general the hedge ratio is related to the underlying objective 
function of the hedger, the nature of the relationship between the cash 
and futures prices, and whether the hedge is a storage hedge or an 
anticipatory hedge; hence, we might not get a hedge ratio of one. 
This study utilizes the following models to derive and estimate 
the optimal hedge ratio(s). These models are basically either based on 
the portfolio approach to hedging developed by Johnson (1960) and Stein 
(1961) or some variation of this approach. 
Price difference model (PPM) 
This model is based on the portfolio approach to hedging developed 
by Johnson (1960) and Stein (1961) and has been utilized by Heifner 
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(1972, 1973) on grain storage and livestock feeding, by Ederington (1979) 
and Hicks (1980) on the treasury bill and certificate of deposits futures 
market, by Anderson and Danthine (1981) on cross hedging, and by Wilson 
(1984, 1985) on sunflower and wheat futures markets. 
Kahl (1983) discusses determination of the recommended hedging ratio 
and argues that if cash market position and futures market position are 
determined simultaneously then the optimal hedging ratio — i.e., the 
level of the futures position relative to the cash position that results 
in the best attainable combination of average profit and risk for a 
particular individual or firm — is independent of risk aversion. She 
argues that if instead one solves for the minimum-risk hedging ratio — 
i.e., the level of futures position relative to the cash.position that 
minimizes the variance of total profits from the two activities — 
assuming the cash position is given (following Johnson or Ederington) or 
stochastic (following McKinnon (1957)), the recommended hedging ratio is 
also independent of risk aversion. However, if the optimal hedging ratio 
is derived assuming the cash market position is given as Peck (1975) 
assumed, then the optimal hedging ratio is dependent on risk aversion. 
Thus, Kahl concludes that the underlying assumptions regarding the cash 
position determines whether risk aversion affects the size of the 
recommended hedging ratio. Benninga, Eldor, and Zilcha (1984) have shown 
that the Johnson-Stein minimum variance hedge ratio is also an optimal 
hedge ratio when the producer is risk averse and if futures prices are an 
unbiased predictor of the future spot prices. 
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Two equations serve as the theoretical basis for this model. The 
first is an equation of expected revenue from holding a commodity. The 
second is an equation representing the price risk associated with that 
commodity, ignoring brokerage and other costs. The equations are; 
E(R) = Xg EfSg - S^) + Xj E (Fg - F^) (3.1) 
Var(R) = X^ + X^ oj + 2 X„ X„ (3.2) 
s s t t s t sx 
where R = return or revenue from the producer's cash and futures 
positions; 
Xg = size (quantity) of cash position; 
Xg = size (quantity) of futures position; 
^1' ^ 2 ~ cash price at the time the hedge is placed or lifted, 
respectively; 
F^, Fg = futures price at the time the hedge is placed or 
lifted, respectively; 
2 2 Og, Og, and = respectively, the variance of cash and futures price 
changes and their covariance; and 
E = expectation operator.^ 
In the above formulation, the price changes are stochastic and the 
spot position, X^, is exogenous. If the goal is to minimize the variance 
positive sign preceding the cash (futures) quantity indicates a 
long cash (futures) position and a negative sign indicates a short 
position. 
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of returns, then the derivative of (3.2) with respect to is set to 
-Xf 
zero and solved for to derive the risk minimizing hedge ratio: 
Xg 
(3.3) 
» 4 
This hedge ratio can be estimated by regressing cash price changes on 
futures price changes because the slope coefficient is an estimate of 
(3.3). So, the regression equation in this case is as follows: 
(Sg - S^) = a + b (Fg - Fj) + li (3.4) 
where ^  is a random error, a and b are parameters to be estimated, and 
other variables are as previously defined. The estimate of b will be an 
estimate of the hedge ratio in equation (3.3). 
Price level model (PLM) 
An alternative hedging model to that given in equations (3.1) and 
(3.2) is appropriate when the hedger is concerned only with the variance 
about the expected return in an anticipatory hedge.^ The target or 
expected price: 
An anticipatory hedge involves protecting a cash position that is 
expected to be taken in the future (i.e., there is no current cash 
position). For example, a farmer which plans to sell his crop at harvest 
might sell futures contracts in an attempt to lock in its future cash 
price. 
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Target price = - E (F^ - S^) (3.5) 
is the appropriate futures contract price observed today less the 
expected basis at the time of closing the hedge and completing the cash 
transaction. Target value of the hedge is: 
Target value (TV) = (-)XjF^ - E[(-)X^F2 - X^Sg]. (3.6) 
The negative sign (-) on X^ is there because a hedger will be taking an 
opposite futures position to the cash position. The variance of target 
value (TV) is; 
Var(TV) = X^ o^ + xf of + 2X_ X„ . (3.7) 
f f2 s 52 f s S2f2 
2 2 
where o- , o , and o - are the variances and covariance of ending 
^2 ®2^2 
futures and cash prices, respectively, at the time the cash transaction 
would be completed. The objective then is to choose the futures position 
(X^) to minimize (3.7). The result is the optimal hedge ratio as; 
r • (3.8) 
In this case, the hedge ratio is the regression coefficient of cash price 
levels regressed on futures price levels during the period when the 
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hedger would be closing the futures position and entering the cash 
market, and the regression equation is: 
Sg = a + p Fg + y (3.9) 
where a and p are parameters to be estimated, y is the random error term, 
and Sg and are the cash and futures prices, respectively, during the 
period when the hedge would be lifted. The estimate of p will be an 
estimate of the hedge ratio in equation (3.8). Price level regressions 
have been utilized by Hayenga and DiPietre (1982a, 1982b) to analyze the 
relationship between wholesale pork products and live hog futures and 
between wholesale beef products and live cattle futures. This procedure 
also has been used in the analysis of cross hedging mill feeds by Miller 
(1985), rice and bran by Elam, Miller, and Holder (1984), and hay by 
Blake and Catlett (1984). 
1 
Modified price difference model (MPDM) 
The price difference model of general type developed by Johnson 
(1960) and Stein (1961) can be used for the hedging of existing position 
in the cash market like a farmer which hedges with his/her crop in 
storage. An anticipatory hedge, however, involves the hedging of an 
anticipated cash (or spot) position like a farmer who in planting time 
^This method is developed and utilized by Overdahl and Starleaf 
(1986) in the hedging performance of the certificate of deposit futures 
market. For a more rigorous treatment of this approach, refer to the 
Overdahl-Starleaf paper. 
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hedges in the futures market to lock in his anticipated cash position at 
harvest. With an anticipatory hedge, one is hedging against movements in 
the spot price relative to the expected spot price and the objective of 
the hedger is to avoid surprises. The surprise is the difference between 
the future cash (or spot) price and the expected future spot price and 
can be denoted by the term: surprise = Sg - where is the 
cash (or spot) price at the time the hedge is lifted (at harvest) and 
the expected cash price at harvest conditioned on the 
information set, 0^^, available at the time the hedge is placed. The 
expected value of a cash (or spot) market surprise offset to some degree 
with a futures position (ignoring the costs associated with futures 
trading) is given by: 
E(R|<j)^) = XgECSg - EXSgl^i)] + XgECFg - F^] . (3.10) 
But, on average the surprise is equal to zero. Also, if futures prices 
follow a martingale then one expects on average the gain (loss) in 
futures position to be equal to zero too (i.e., ECFg - Fj^] = 0). So, if 
information is used rationally and if costs associated with futures 
trading are small enough to be considered zero, then the expected return 
on a hedged position should equal that of unhedged position, where the 
expected value of unhedged position is given by: 
E(T|(j)j) = XgECSg - EXSgl^ i)]. (3.11) 
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What becomes relevant in this model is the conditional variances and 
covariances of surprises and changes in futures price. The conditional 
variance of hedged position is; 
var(R|*i) = Xg varCS^ - ECSgl^i)] + Xg varCFg - F^] 
+ 2XgXg covCCSg - EfSglfi)), (Fg - F^)]. (3.12) 
Differentiating equation (3.12) with respect to and equating to zero 
yields; 
X, cov[(S- - E(S^|(j).)), (F„ - F.)] 
- r v,r(F,^^) 
Equation (3.13) gives the optimal (risk minimizing) hedge ratio for the 
hedger. In this model, the optimal hedge ratio can be estimated by using 
the following regression equation: 
(Sg - EXSglf^)) = d + h(F2 - F^) + e (3.14) 
where all variables are the same as before, d and h are parameters to be 
estimated, and e is random error. The estimate of h will be an estimate 
of the optimal hedge ratio in equation (3.14).^ A reasonable proxy for 
In the price difference model, risk minimization is not ordinarily 
consistent with expected utility maximization, as the hedger would be 
concerned with the trade off between risk and return. However, under the 
conditions specified in the modified version of the price difference 
model, the expected return on a hedged position is zero so that there is 
no trade off, meaning the risk minimization will be consistent with 
expected utility maximization. For a complete proof of this point, refer 
to Overdahl (1984). 
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the expected future spot price will be localized futures contract price, 
where one adjusts current future price for normal basis, i.e.; 
= (F^ - normal basis). (3.15) 
Utilizing this equation with equation (3.14) and subsuming constant 
normal basis into the regression intercept we have: 
(Sg - Fj) = g + h(F2 - F^) + e (3.16) 
where g is the regression intercept and other variables are as previously 
defined. The estimate of h will be the estimate of the optimal hedge 
ratio under this method. 
Estimation of the optimal hedge ratio^ 
Optimal hedge ratios for each of the models were estimated using 
weekly (Thursday prices) of Northcentral Iowa cash prices and Thursday 
2 
closing soybean futures prices at the Chicago Board of Trade. It was 
assumed that a hedger might trade a fractional number of contracts. This 
^Witt, Schroeder, and Hayenga (1987) have discussed conceptual and 
practical differences of different approaches (including price difference 
and price level models) used for estimating optimal hedge ratios. 
^The main reason this study focuses on Northcentral Iowa is that 
according to Wisner (1985) and Wisner and Jolly (1984), the production 
risk and yield variations have been historically low in Northeast and 
Northcentral Iowa compared to the other parts of the state and, hence, 
risk associated with crop price variations is a more important problem 
for Northcentral Iowa farmers than risk of crop variations. 
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assumption allows the full potential of hedging to be demonstrated. 
Following are the empirical results under each model. 
Empirical results under the price difference model (PPM) 
The price difference model was used to estimate the optimal hedge 
ratio for the storage hedges. It is assumed that the hedge is placed at 
harvest time (November 1) and is lifted by the first week of March which 
is the contract month. To estimate the hedge ratio for each year, weekly 
cash and futures prices of the last two weeks of February and October and 
the first week of November and March of the previous three years are 
used. For example, to estimate the hedge ratio for 1975, the weekly cash 
and futures prices of the second half of February and first week of March 
in 1972 through 1974 are used. The data encompassed 1972 to 1984. The 
estimates of the optimal hedge ratio (using equation (3.4)) for each year 
are shown in Table 3.1. The value of Durbin-Waton (D.W.) statistics 
indicated the presence of positive first-order autocorrelation of the 
residuals for regression estimates in 1977, 1981, and 1984.^ Estimates 
^The presence of positive first-order serial correlation leads to an 
R that gives an overly optimistic picture of the success of 
least-squares regression. Moreover, least squares will lead to an 
estimate of the error variance which is smaller than the true error 
variance, hence the success of the regression procedure will be 
overstated if the least-squares estimate of the error variance is used to 
do statistical tests. Thus, for the remainder of this chapter tests of 
significance are done after the correction for serial correlation. For 
detailed discussion of the above points, refer to Chapter 6 in Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld (1981). 
Table 3.1. Regression estimates under the price difference model (FDM) 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Intercept 0.205 
(3.0)* 
0.10 
(2.13) 
0.24 
(9.12) 
0.216 
(7.44) 
0.14 
(3.65) 
0.32 
(13.23) 
0.329 
(6.46) 
0.53 
(13.6) 
0.40 
(9.87) 
0.39 
(6.2) 
0.30 
(4.58) 
Slope^ 0.916 
(33.7) 
0.851 
(34.9) 
0.904 
(68.5) 
0.903 
(23.9) 
0.977 
(18.71) 
0.51 
(9.64) 
0.728 
(17.7) 
0.855 
(28.4) 
0.777 
(24.2) 
0.866 
(12.87) 
0.892 
(12.57) 
0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.978 0.99 0.98 0.95 0.95 
D.W. 0.927 1.57 2.88 1.75 1.72 2.52 0.709 2.31 1.649 0.405 1.97 
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
^-statistics are in parentheses below the respective coefficient. 
^Estimated hedge ratios are given by estimates of slope coefficients. 
^Number of observations. 
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of regression corrected for autocorrelation are shown in Table 3.2.^ 
For most of the years, corrected hedge ratios are significantly different 
from one at the 0.05 level of significance. A smaller (larger) hedge 
ratio indicates that one futures contract will establish the price of a 
larger (smaller) amount of the cash commodity. So-, if the value of 
optimal hedge ratio is larger, more contracts must be used to achieve the 
2 
optimal hedge, and more commission would be required. 
Empirical results under the price level model (PLM) 
The price level model was used to estimate the optimal hedge ratio 
for anticipatory hedges. The hedge is placed at mid-March and is lifted 
by early November. The November futures contract is utilized. To 
estimate hedge ratios for each year, weekly cash and futures prices of 
the second half of October and the first week of November of the previous 
three years have been utilized. For example, to estimate the hedge ratio 
of 1975, weekly cash and futures prices of the second half of October and 
the first week of November in 1972 through 1974 are used. Or, to 
estimate hedge ratios for 1984, the weekly cash and futures prices of 
corresponding periods in 1981 through 1983 are used. The data 
^The procedure used to correct for autocorrelation of the residuals 
is the PROG AUTOREG subroutine of the statistical analysis system (SAS) 
package. The procedure is equivalent to a generalized least squares 
estimate of the regression coefficients with appropriate weights. 
2 
In general, when the estimated value of the optimal hedge ratio is 
positive, it means that the hedger's position in futures will be the same 
as his position in cash. In other words, cash and futures prices move in 
the same direction. If absolute value of the optimal hedge ratio is 
greater than one, then the size of futures position will be greater than 
the size of cash position. 
Table 3.2. Regression estimates under the price difference model (PDM) corrected for 
possible first-order autocorrelation 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Intercept 0.205 
(3.0)* 
0.10 0.243 
(2.13) (14.4) 
0.216 
(7.44) 
0.14 
(3.65) 
0.32 
(13.23) 
0.31 
(3.9) 
0.53 
(13.6) 
0.40 
(9.87) 
0.39 
(4.6) 
0.30 
(4.58) 
Slope^ 0.916* 
(33.7) 
0.851* 0.903* 
(34.9) (102.5) 
0.903* 
(23.9) 
0.977 
(18.71) 
0.51* 
(9.64) 
0.738* 
(14.21) 
0.855* 
(28.4) 
0.777* 
(24.2) 
0.847* 
(14.5) 
0.892 
(12.57) 
0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.95 
NC 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
*Indicates significantly different from one at the 0.05 level. 
*t-statistics are in parentheses below the respective coefficient. 
^Estimated hedge ratios are given by estimates of slope coefficients. 
^Number of observations. 
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encompassed 1972 to 1984. The estimates of optimal hedge ratios under 
this model (i.e., under equation (3.9)) are shown in Table 3.3. The 
value of Durbin-Watson (D.W.) statistics indicated the presence of 
positive first-order serial correlation of the residuals for regression 
estimates in 1976, 1980, 1981, 1984, and 1985. Regression estimates were 
corrected for autocorrelation using the "PROC AUTOREG" procedure 
explained previously. Corrected estimates are given in Table 3.4. 
Corrected estimated slope coefficients for 1975, 1975, 1982, and 1983 in 
Table 3.4 were significantly different from one at the 0.05 level of 
significance. A smaller (larger) hedge ratio indicates that one futures 
contract will establish the price of a larger (smaller) amount of the 
anticipated cash commodity. 
Empirical results under the modified price difference model (MPDM) 
Equation (3.15) was used to estimate hedge ratios for hedges placed 
in mid-March and lifted in early November which was the relevant contract 
month. The terra (F^ - F^) in equation (3.16) represents the changes in 
the soybean futures prices over the life of the hedge. To estimate hedge 
ratios for each year, weekly cash and futures prices of the second half 
of October and the first week of November, and futures prices in the 
second half of February and the first week of March of the preceding 
three years are utilized. Estimated hedge ratios along with other 
statistics are shown in Table 3.5. Durbin-Watson statistics indicated 
there was positive first-order serial correlation of the residuals for 
regression estimates in 1979, 1980, 1981, 1983, 1984, and 1985. 
Table 3.3. Regression estimates under the price level model (PLM) 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Intercept -0.11 
(-1.7)* 
-0.21 
(-1.67) 
-0.25 
(-1.72) 
-0.43 
(-2.54) 
-0.22 
(-1.43) 
0.059 
(0.13) 
-0.07 
(-0.21) 
-0.32 
(-1.87) 
0.30 
(1.66) 
-0.56 
(-1.59) 
-0.21 
(-1.2) 
Slope^ 0.95 
(87.9) 
0.96 
(49.4) 
0.969 
(44.2) 
1.0 
(33.5) 
0.96 
(38.8) 
0.90 
(13.1) 
0.914 
(20.35) 
0.939 
(39.7) 
0.863 
(33.0) 
1.01 
(19.54) 
0.986 
(36.6) 
0-99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 
D.W. 2.62 2.74 2.61 2.33 1.69 0.97 1.08 1.84 1.349 0.394 0.884 
NC 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
^t-statistics are in parentheses below the respective coefficient. 
^Estimated hedge ratios are given by estimates of slope coefficients. 
'^Number of observations. 
Table 3.4. Regression estimates under the price level model (PLM) corrected for possible 
first-order autocorrelation 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Intercept -0.11 -0.18 -0.25 -0.43 -0.22 -0.105 -0.04 -0.32 0.30 -0.32 -0.096 
(-1.7)* (-1.88) (-1.72) (-2.54) (-1.43) (-0.19) (-0.10) (-1.87) (1.66) (-0.92) (-0.515) 
Slope^ 0.95* 0.957* 0.969 1.0 0.96 0.926 0.911 0.939* 0.863* 0.976 0.965 
(87.9) (64.7) (44.2) (33.5) (38.8) (10.56) (16.6) (39.7) (33.0) (20.3) (35.0) 
R2 0.99 0,99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
9  9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9  
*Indicates significantly different from one at the 0.05 level. 
*t-statistics are in parentheses below the respective coefficient. 
^Estimated hedge ratios are given by estimates of slope coefficients. 
'"Number of observations. 
Table 3.5. Regression estimates under the modified price difference model (MPDM) 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Intercept -0.21 
(-4.2)* 
-0.41 
(-9.2) 
-0.42 
(-10.1) ( 
-0.42 
-21.9) 
-0.45 
(-24.4) ( 
-0.57 
-10.4) 
-0.70 
(-10.0) 
-0.77 
(-29.9) 
-0.66 
(-10.2) 
-0.45 
(-8.85) 
-0.31 
(-9.79) 
Slope^ 0.855 
(24.1) 
0.97 
(30.8) 
0.969 
(32.7) 
1.0 
(69.0) 
0.988 
(77.4) 
0.97 
(22.4) 
0.99 
(16.9) 
0.95 
(50.1) 
0.90 
(20.4) 
1.05 
(33.3) 
0.98 
(44.7) 
R^ 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 
D.W. 2.46 1.95 2.12 2.32 1.21 0.77 0.91 2.35 0.67 0.78 0.83 
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
®t-statistics are in parentheses below the respective coefficient. 
^Estimated hedge ratios are given by estimates of slope coefficients. 
^Number of observations. 
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Corrected regression estimates are shown in Table 3.6. The procedure 
used to correct for autocorrelation was the same as in the previous two 
models. Of all the corrected hedge ratios in Table 3.6, only estimated 
slope coefficients in 1975 and 1982 were significantly different from one 
at the 0.05 level of significance. The estimated hedge ratio is the 
number of futures contracts that should be used to provide an optimal 
hedge for an anticipated cash position. The hedge ratio means it is 
costly to achieve a given level of protection. 
Equation (3.16) was rewritten as: 
Sg = g + h Fg + (1 - h) + E (3.17) 
and reestimated subject to the restriction that the coefficients on 
and Fg should add up to one. There was no significant quantitative or 
qualitative change in the empirical results as a result of this 
reestimation. This suggests that there should not be a correlation 
between basis term and (F^ - F^) term and we can subsume basis into the 
intercept of regression equation (3.16). 
Estimated hedge ratios in this chapter will be used in determining 
the risk-return distributions of some of the hedge strategies which will 
be developed in Chapter 5. The performance of hedging strategies 
(utilizing price level or modified price difference model hedge ratios), 
in terms of the risk-return distribution of the respective hedging 
strategies might shed more light on the effectiveness of the optimal 
hedge ratio under the price level model (PLM) and modified 
price difference model (MPDM). 
Table 3.6. Regression estimates under the modified price difference model (MPDM) corrected for 
possible first-order autocorrelation 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Intercept -0.21 -0.41 -0.42 -0.42 -0.45 -0.56 -0.68 -0.77 -0.64 -0.47 -0.32 
(-4.2)** (-9.2) (-10.1) (-21.9) (-17.0) (-5.9) (-6.6) (-29.9). (-6.7) (-5.9) (-6.51) 
Slope^ 0.855 0.97 0.969 1.0 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.95 0.949 1.03 0.968 
(24.1) (30.8) (32.7) (69.0) (69.2) (21.2) (14.96) (50.1) (21.24) (26.7) (42.8) 
R^ 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.995 0.997 
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
*Indicates significantly different from one at the 0.05 level, 
^t-statistics are in parentheses below the respective coefficient. 
^Estimated hedge ratios are given by estimates of slope coefficients, 
dumber of observations. 
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CHAPTER 4. OPTIONS MARKET 
In late 1984 and early 1985, trading in commodity options on 
soybeans, corn, hogs, and cattle (as well as a number of other 
commodities) began in the U.S. The market was given an initial 
three-year pilot period over which time it would be subject to a 
comprehensive review by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). 
Since this time, commodity option trading has become a topic of high 
interest in both academic environments and the trading community. 
Definitions 
Prior to further investigation of the options market, it is useful 
to define some of the key terms used in the following discussion: 
An option: A contract that gives the buyer the right but not the 
obligation to buy or sell a futures contract at a specific price 
within a specified time period. 
Put option: The right to take a short futures position (to sell a 
futures contract), between the purchase date and the option 
expiration date, at a fixed price. 
Call option: The right to take a long futures position (to buy a futures 
contract), between the purchased date and the option expiration 
date, at a fixed price. 
Strike price (also known as the exercise price); The fixed price at 
which the option can be exercised. On soybeans these are offered at 
fixed $0.25/bu increments. 
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Premium (the price of the option): The amount the purchaser of the 
option has to pay for the option, or the amount the option grantor 
receives for selling the option. 
Exercise: Converting the option into a futures position. 
Let expire; Not exercising the option prior to its expiration date. 
Intrinsic value; Gain an option owner could realize if the option were 
exercised and an offsetting futures market transaction were 
implemented. This is the difference between the strike price and 
futures price. If no gain could be made by exercising and 
offsetting, then the option has a zero intrinsic value. 
In-the-money; An option, which if exercised and the futures position 
offset, would result in a gain to the exerciser. 
At-the-money: An option with a strike price equivalent to the futures 
price. 
Out-of-the-money; An option, which if exercised and the futures position 
offset, would result in a loss to the exerciser. 
Option Pricing Theory 
Options on the agricultural commodity futures market began trading 
in late October 1984 for grains and livestock. Because of the limited 
trading time on soybean options, in order to evaluate the potential use 
of options it is necessary to backcast or simulate the option premiums 
over an historical time period. 
Black and Scholes (1973) developed the first comprehensive 
equilibrium option pricing model. The Black-Scholes model assumes that 
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any profits which, can be arbitraged from incorrectly priced options will 
drive the option premium toward their intrinsic value. Black and Scholes 
described a formula for calculating the value of a call option on stock. 
This formula shows that the price of a call option depends on five 
factors; the price of the underlying security (F), the strike or 
exercise price of the option (X), the volatility of the price of the 
underlying security (o), the time remaining to maturity (T), and the 
level of the risk-free interest rate (r). The major assumptions of their 
model are: the markets for futures and options are frictionless (e.g., 
there are no restrictions on short sales, no transactions costs, and no 
taxes); the risk-free rate of interest is known and constant over the 
life of the option; the fractional change in the futures price over any 
interval is distributed log-normally with a known variance rate equal to 
2 
o which is constant over the life of the option; and the option is 
European, that is, it can only be exercised at maturity. The Black-
El choies theory was initially developed for stock options, but it has 
since been modified and adapted to commodity markets. There have been 
numerous discussions and modifications of the original Black-Scholes 
model. 
Merton (1973) generalized the results of the Black-Scholes model to 
allow for a stochastic interest rate and the payment of dividends. Using 
dominance arguments he also demonstrated that the value of an American 
call option, which has the early exercise privilege, is identical to that 
of a European call option and he derived bounds on the difference between 
the values of American and European put options. Merton argued that 
early exercise of stock option had no value unless dividends were 
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involved and since no dividends are involved on commodity futures, one 
might conclude that this problem is irrelevant. He also argued that in 
practice American options are almost never exercised before expiration. 
The reason is that option has two potential sources of value: its 
immediate exercise value (i.e., its intrinsic value, if any) and its 
potential for price appreciation in the future (i.e., its time value). 
Thus, an investor, in most cases, will be able to realize a greater 
profit by selling the option instead of exercising it, so he concluded 
that American and European options should be priced similarly. 
Black (1976) extended the theory of stock option pricing to the 
problem of pricing commodity options. This model was designed to price 
options on the futures contract of an underlying asset. As such, it is 
both a refinement of and equivalent to the original Black-Scholes option 
pricing model, which theoretically prices options on the underlying asset 
itself. According to the Black model: 
C = e"^^[F»N(d^) - X*N(d2)] 
where C is the price of the call option, F is the price of the underlying 
futures contract, X is the contract's exercise price, r is the risk-free 
rate of interest, t is the number of time periods before the option 
expires (expressed as a fraction of a year), and N(d^) and N(d2) are the 
standard cumulative normal-distribution function evaluated at points: 
[ln(f) + 4^1 
d ^ ' , 
^ o it 
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[ln(|) - 4^J 
ait 
2 
where o represents the variance of expected future returns on the 
2 
underlying futures contract over time. If o is constant and if taxes 
and transaction costs are zero, the above results can be derived by 
solving a differential equation for the change in the value of hedged 
risk-free portfolio over time (given certain boundary conditions). Puts 
are priced similarly as: 
P = -e"^^[F*N(-d^) - X'NC-dg)] 
where P is the price of the put option. The use of the cumulative normal 
density function is a result of the assumption that returns on the 
futures contract follow a normal distribution. For example, N(d^) 
represents the number of futures contracts an investor should sell per 
call option purchased in order to create a risk-free portfolio. As long 
as [F'N(d^) - X'Nfdg)] & 0, then C à 0. This is always true given the 
F 
relationships between In(jj) , F, X, d^, and d^ (since a and t are 
positive). Thus, the price of a call option can never be negative. If S 
equals the spot price of the security or commodity underlying a futures 
contract, and h equals the cost of holding this asset over time (e.g., 
interest and storage costs), then the substitution of Se^^ for F in the 
Black model yields the original Black-Scholes formula. In markets that 
fully reflect carrying costs, the models could be used interchangeably to 
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value options; certain assumptions that underlie option pricing theory, 
however, imply that the Black model should be a more accurate representa­
tion of actual option prices than the Black-Scholes formula.^ 
Closed form, continuous time option pricing models of the Black-
Scholes variety do not account for the special characteristics of put and 
2 
call options on agricultural commodities. These characteristics are; 
early exercise, price supports, and nonconstant variance. The basic 
option pricing models assume that it is never best to exercise the option 
before expiration. Also, of the agricultural commodities on which 
options are offered, corn, soybeans, wheat, and cotton all operate under 
3 
a price support system. For each of these commodities, the loan rate 
These include institutional imperfections, relative market 
liquidities, and the theoretical distributions of the underlying spot and 
future prices. See Asay (1982) and Samuelson (1965). 
^Asay (1982 and 1983) points out some of the desirable qualities 
commodity options models ought to have to avoid many of the analytical 
drawbacks of the Black-Scholes model. 
^According to Gardner (1981), the most massive price support 
programs historically have been in grains. The mechanism is like this: 
producers of the grain often desire to store the crop or part of it, in 
hopes of post-harvest appreciation in the price. But, if the harvest 
season price is below the support price, and if the farmer sells his 
grain to the government at the support price, he loses his chance to 
benefit from post-harvest appreciation in the price. In order to give 
the producer a chance to benefit from the best of both situations, 
"nonrecourse loan" programs were developed during the 1930s and continue 
into the 1980s as the basis for market price supports for the grains and 
cotton. Under provisions of the price support loan-rate program (loan 
rate is the term used for the market support price), producers who comply 
with grain program requirements (for instance, reduced acreage planted by 
ten percent) are eligible for a "nonrecourse loan." The Commodity Credit 
Corporation loan is in many respects like the loan that one might receive 
from a bank, using stored grain as collateral. The main difference is 
the "nonrecourse." If the producer chooses not to repay the loan, the 
CGC must accept the grain as full payment, and no interest is charged. 
The producer must pay the storage costs, however. Producers then have 
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sets a lower bound on price. The effects of support price programs on 
expected crop prices have been investigated by Belongia (1983), Boehlje 
and Griffin (1979), and others. Gardner (1977) has viewed price supports 
as put options granted by government to farmers at no cost. Calculations 
of put option premiums in the presence of price supports is very 
difficult with continuous time models such as the Black model. The basic 
option pricing models, such as the Black model (1976) , also assume that 
the variance of futures prices is constant. While this assumption may 
hold approximately for financial instruments or metals, the variance of 
futures price changes for many agricultural commodities has been found to 
vary seasonally according to studies by Anderson (1982), Gordon (1985a), 
and Jordan, Seale, McCabe, and Kenyon (1985). The theoretical arguments 
for nonconstant variance are made by Samuelson (1965), who hypothesizes 
that variance increases as delivery approaches, and Anderson and Danthine 
(1981), who hypothesize that variance may increase or decrease depending 
two options: they can hold their grain and market it at their discretion 
or they can obtain a loan. The value of a loan is determined by the loan 
rate multiplied by the number of bushels placed in storage. The loan 
rate is a legislatively determined price per bushel that serves, 
essentially, as a price floor. Gardner (1981, p. 24) also views the loan 
program as an effective season-average price floor in the neighborhood of 
the loan rate. The loan is in effect for less than one year (usually 
nine months). If market prices do not rise to levels substantially above 
the loan rate over the period of the loan, farmers can forfeit their 
grain to the CCC as full payment for the loan. Forfeiture of grain in 
this manner contributes to CCC grainstocks — government stocks separate 
from those in the farmer-owned reserve. In contrast, if market price 
should rise above loan rates, farmers may elect to repay the loan, remove 
their grain from storage, and sell it. While grain prices are supported 
primarily by loan rates, producer income is supported directly by target 
prices and deficiency payments. If market prices are below the target 
price established by law, farmers receive a transfer payment from the 
government for the size of price differential. 
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on the flow of information into the market. Rutledge (1976), Grauer 
(1977), and Miller (1979) have tested Samuelson's hypothesis and they 
have mixed results. More recent studies consider seasonality, a type of 
Anderson-Danthine effect. Anderson (1982) and Gordon (1985a) find that 
seasonality dominates the maturity effect in the markets with seasonal 
supply variability. It also has been hypothesized that, as futures 
prices decline, the variance may decrease due to the truncating effect of 
the support price on the probability distribution of prices. This effect 
is explored in futures option pricing studios by Gordon (1985b) and Plato 
(1985) with the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein numerical option pricing algorithm. 
Choi and Longstaff (1985) have argued that seasonality in volatility is 
related to price level through the constant-elasticity-of-variance option 
pricing model (CEV) developed by Cox (1975). In a regression model based 
on this idea, they found a significant relationship between variance and 
price level for soybean futures. They point out that the (CEV) model may 
be preferred to the Black-Scholes model for commodities which have a 
higher variance in price as the mean price increases. 
Financial economists such as Sharpe (1978), Rendleman and Bartter 
(1979), and Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979) have developed recursive 
dynamic programming models with price following multiplicative binomial 
processes (i.e., discrete-time approach to option pricing) in order to 
value options which allow early exercise (American options). Cox, Ross, 
and Rubinstein (1979), hereafter referred to as CRR, give a detailed 
discussion of that approach for stock options, which allows significant 
generalization. In particular, the algorithm can be modified to account 
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for price supports and changing variance in the price of the underlying 
commodity, thereby permitting an evaluation of the effect of a price 
support on the value of a put option. Gordon (1985b) calculated the 
effect of price supports on the put option premium for soybeans using 
the CRR model. He found that price supports lower the value of put 
options and provide an alternative to them. 
Plato (1985) adapted the approach of CRR to calculate the value of 
American put options on commodity futures. He found that the continuous 
time, no early exercise (European) option pricing models of the Black 
(1976) or Black and Scholes (1973) type underestimated the value of a put 
option. The underestimation increased at an exercise price further 
in-the-money. He found that the increase in value is due to the early 
exercise feature of American options. 
Option Pricing Model 
What follows is a brief summary of the option pricing model as 
developed by Black and Scholes (1973), simplified to a discrete model by 
Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979), and clarified and converted to apply to 
commodity markets (not just stocks) by Plato (1985). Further refinements 
to the model have been suggested by Jarrow and Rudd (1983) and 
implemented by Gordon (1985b). 
Option pricing theory is based on the concept of the perfect or 
riskless hedge. This hedge involves simultaneous and offsetting 
positions in an asset; for example, a stock, physical commodity, or 
commodity futures contract, and an option of the asset (not the typical 
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producer type hedge where the hedge offsets cash price risk). One can 
make the hedge riskless by maintaining the ideal or perfect ratio of 
asset units to option units. This perfect hedge ratio balances gains on 
the asset position with losses on the option position or losses on the 
asset position with gains on the option position. Because the hedge is 
riskless, the equity or amount invested in the hedge is specified as 
earning the riskless rate of return. Gains and losses on the option are 
a function of the level of the asset price and the time remaining until 
the option expires. Therefore, to keep the hedge riskless, the ratio of 
units of the asset to the units of options must be continually 
readjusted. The riskless hedge between a commodity futures and a put 
option is outlined by Plato (1985) summarizing Black and Scholes' (1973) 
original idea as: 
HAfAt + APat - rP; (4.1) 
where H = hedge ratio (number of commodity futures contracts per put 
option in the riskless hedge), - F^ = change in futures price 
over the time interval At, and F^ = commodity futures price at beginning 
of time interval At, AP^^ = P^^^ - P^ = change in put option price over 
time interval At, P^ = put option premium at the beginning of time 
interval At, and r = riskless interest rate over time interval At. 
Equation (4.1) essentially states that the change in value of the 
commodity futures position plus the change in value of the option 
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position is equal to the opportunity cost of the funds invested in the 
option. The value of a futures position is zero at the beginning of time 
interval At.^ Therefore, the level of the future price does not show up 
in equation (4.1). Long positions are held in both the put option and 
futures markets in order to make the hedge riskless because put option 
2 price changes move in an opposite direction from futures price changes. 
The objective is to solve this equation for the option premium. 
Equation (4.1) must be solved by the use of differential equations. 
However, Plato points out that if the options are American, analytical 
differential equation solutions of equation (4.1) are only possible under 
the assumption that the option cannot be exercised early. However, 
American commodity options can be exercised early. The Cox, Ross, and 
Rubinstein (CRR) algorithm provides an analytical approach to calculating 
the option premium even under the possibility of early exercise. The 
basic theory developed by Black and Scholes relied on the assumption that 
from the option purchase date until the option expires, the price of the 
underlying commodity would be approximately distributed log normally. 
Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein note that the log normal distribution can be 
^Black (1976) assumed that the current futures price.equals the 
expected futures price at contract expiration. The current value of a 
futures position is zero under Black's assumption regardless of any 
previous gains or losses. Since futures contracts are settled daily with 
gains being added to the trader's account and losses deducted from 
his/her account, the value of the futures contract is reset to zero each 
day. The value of the equity of the hedged position is then just the 
value of the option., 
2 
Plus signs indicate a long position and negative signs a short 
position. The convention is maintained for the rest of this chapter. 
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approximated as the product of a large number of binomial changes. The 
algorithm backcasts through time from the option expiration date back to 
the beginning of the time period. The reason for starting at the 
expiration date and then estimating backwards to determine the present 
option premium is because at expiration the value of the option is 
strictly its intrinsic value which, given the strike price and ending 
futures price, can be calculated. 
The Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein algorithm requires one to divide the 
time remaining until option expiration into T equal intervals. The time 
frame can be thought of as follows; 
The price of the commodity during each interval is specified as 
moving up or down according to the multiplicative binomial distribution 
where the price at the end of an interval is: 
1 2 3 t t+1 T T+1 
Present Option 
expiration 
(4.2) 
or 
(4.3) 
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for an increase (u) and decrease (d) in the commodity futures price, 
respectively. The parameters u and d are the possible outcomes from the 
binomial distribution over interval At. 
The algorithm calculates the possible commodity futures prices using 
the outcomes from the multiplicative binomial distribution from the 
beginning of the current interval to the option expiration date. The 
possible commodity futures prices when the option expires are given by: 
^T+l,j " F^, for j =0, 1, 2, • • • I T (4.4) 
where T-j = the number of commodity futures price increases, 
j = the number of commodity futures price decreases, and 
= the commodity futures price at the beginning of the first 
(present) time interval. 
These commodity futures prices can then be used to calculate the 
ending premiums for the options (their intrinsic value) which gives: 
For puts: 
^T+l,j ^ ^"^T+l,j^' j = 0, 1. 2, • • • t T. (4.5) 
For calls; 
^T+l,j ^ ^T+l,j~^^' for j = 0, 1, 2, • • • > T (4.6) 
where P = the put. option premiums. 
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C = the call option premiums, and 
K = the strike price associated with the respective premium. 
The algorithm then calculates all possible commodity futures prices for 
the beginning of the last time interval. These prices are calculated 
just as in equation (4.4) except that T-1 replaces T, and T replaces T+1. 
This is used to calculate the option premiums for the beginning of the 
last time interval. Next, we can rewrite equation (4.1) as: 
H(F„i - F^) + - (l+r)P^ 
which says that the change in the value of the futures position over the 
t-th time interval plus the value of the put position at the end of this 
interval equals the equity in the riskless hedge increased at the 
riskless interest rate. The futures price, , given F^, can have two 
possible values because the futures price is specified as following the 
multiplicative binomial distribution. The two futures price outcomes, 
given F^ are shown in the following two equations; 
«Cl -
«Ct+l - ^ t' + Pt+l • (l+r)?;. (4.8) 
The value of the equity in the riskless hedge (value of funds invested in 
the option), P^, can also be thought of as equivalent to a riskless bond, 
B, that is worth (l+r)B at the end of the t-th time interval. Plato 
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(1985) shows that the put option premium and the corresponding riskless 
hedge ratio can be calculated in each subsequent period by solving 
equations (4.7) and (4.8) simultaneously (utilizing equations 4.2 and 
4.3) for and H. These solutions are given by the following 
equations : 
where the minimum value of the premium in each period is the option 
intrinsic value. 
The riskless hedge between a commodity futures and a call option can 
be generated by having a short position in futures markets and a long 
position in call options because call option price changes move in the 
same direction as futures price changes. This riskless hedge is 
represented as; 
where equals the call option premium at the beginning of time interval 
At, and the rest of the terms are as defined before. Following the same 
procedure as used in deriving the put option premium and the 
corresponding riskless hedge ratio, one can calculate the call option 
premium in each subsequent period as; 
= ([(l-d)/(u-d)]P*+i + [(u-l)/(u-d)]pJ^j)/(l+r), (4.9) 
(4.10) 
(4.11) 
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= ([(l-d)/(u-d)]C*+i + [(u-l)/(u-d)]cj^^}/(l+r) (4.12) 
and the corresponding riskless hedge ratio is; 
» t =  -  c d + i ) / [ ( d - . ) F ; ] .  (4.13) 
The values of u and d have yet to be defined. Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein 
showed that 
where exp = exponential "e" = 2.71828..., 
o = the annual standard deviation of the rate of commodity 
futures price, and 
Tau = the fraction of a year until the option expires and is 
partitioned into T equal time intervals. 
Jarrow and Rudd (1983, pp. 176-188) have shown that more consistent 
values of u and d require a modification of equations (4.14) and (4.15) 
into : 
u = exp[o(Tau/T)^/^], (4.14) 
d = exp[-o(Tau/T) (4.15) 
u = exp[o(Tau/T)^/^ - ^  o^(Tau/T)], (4.16) 
d = exp[-o(Tau/T)^/^ - ^  o^(Tau/T)]. (4.17) 
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These modifications of u and d ensure that both the binomial and log 
normal process have the same first two moments (mean and variance) for 
each T as T-«o. Equations (4.14) and (4.15) only ensure the equality of 
the means at the limit and not the equality of the variances (Jarrow and 
Rudd, 1983, pp. 176-188). 
The option pricing model used here has some significant advantages 
to the Black-Scholes model. The Black-Scholes model was developed for 
European options which can be exercised only at expiration. However, the 
American options contracts have specifications allowing for exercise at 
any time prior to expiration. Therefore, the American option is valued 
slightly higher due to this additional flexibility than its European 
counterpart. The CRR model explicitly allows for the possibility of 
early exercise by forcing the option premium to remain at or above the 
option's intrinsic value over its remaining life. 
The CRR model can also be easily modified to allow for truncated 
price distributions. That is, the Black-Scholes model assumes that 
prices follow a log normal distribution. The CRR model assumes prices 
follow a binomial process (which approaches the log normal process in the 
limit). The CRR model due to its iterative nature, can easily be 
modified to implement price floors or price ceilings into the model. For 
example, for soybean options the government loan rate could be considered 
a price floor and a lower limit could easily be implemented into the 
model restricting the futures prices from falling below the loan rate 
(Gordon, 1985b). 
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The CRR model in the limit approaches the Black-Scholes model as the 
number of iterations approaches infinity and if one assumes no early 
exercise is allowed and that the price does not have a truncated 
distribution. As these additional restrictions are added, the premiums 
will change. 
Empirical Option Pricing 
A computer program of the option pricing model used to estimate the 
historical option premium series is provided in Appendix A. The program 
is written in Microsoft Basic and can be used with the Zenith (IBM 
compatible) microcomputer. The bulk of the program was taken from Plato 
(1985). However, the changes suggested in equations 4.16 and 4.17 and 
additional adjustments to account for effects of price supports on option 
premiums have been explicitly included in the option pricing model used 
here. 
The model requires data for current market conditions. The data 
requirements include; 1) the current underlying futures price (F^), 
i.e., the soybean futures price for the respective contract corresponding 
to the option premium being estimated, 2) the riskless annual interest 
rate (r) assumed constant over the life of the option,^ 3) the proportion 
of the year remaining until option expiration (Tau), 4) the annual 
volatility of the futures price (o), 5) the number of periods 
^The interest rate used for this was the U.S. Treasury bill market 
yields (average bid and ask discount rate for the week containing the 
15th day of the month) whose maturity most closely matched, without being 
less than, the remaining portion of the year until the option matured 
(3-, 6-, and 12-month T-bill rates were used). 
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(iterations) until option expiration (T), and 6) the strike price being 
considered (k). 
Plato (1985) split the period remaining until expiration into 75 
equal intervals (T) to estimate soybean option prices. He found this to 
be an adequate number of periods to be able to estimate option premiums 
close to the actual ones. Gordon (1985b) used 61 periods to estimate 
premiums for soybeans. Jarrow and Rudd (1983) advocated using as many as 
150 time intervals to help insure the accuracy of the model. To save 
computer time (it takes about two minutes to calculate a single premium), 
75 intervals were used in this study. This number was found to be 
adequate in previous studies (Plato, 1985, and Gordon, 1985b). 
Aside from the futures price and strike price, the most critical 
information one must have is the volatility of the underlying futures 
price. Small changes in the futures price variance cause significant 
changes in the estimated premium. Wolf (1984), Jordan et al. (1985), 
Plato (1985), Gordon (1985b), Hauser and Neff (1985), and Hauser and 
Andersen (1987) have good discussions on the significance of the 
volatilities on the option premium estimates. 
A sensitivity analysis of the key components of the option price 
model used in this study was done in order to provide an idea of how 
changes in the various factors would affect the estimated premiums. The 
more sensitive the premiums are to a given factor, the more crucial it is 
that one have a representative measure of that factor to use in the 
models. Results of the sensitivity analysis are summarized in Table 4.1. 
Separately varying five or six previously mentioned data requirements of 
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Table 4.1. Sensitivity analysis of the option pricing model for put and 
call options 
Futures 
price 
($/bu) 
Strike 
price 
($/bu) Interest Tau T Sigma 
Calculated 
put 
premium 
($/bu) 
Calculated 
call 
premium 
($/bu) 
— varying strike price -
6.0 5.50 0.08 0.40 75 0.20 0.10 0.59 
6.0 5.75 0.08 0.40 75 0.20 0.18 0.42 
6.0 6.0 0.08 0.40 75 0.20 0.29 0.29 
6.0 6.25 0.08 0.40 75 0.20 0.44 0.19 
6.0 6.50 0.08 0.40 75 0.20 0.61 0.12 
— varying interest rate 
6.0 6.0 0.04 0.40 75 0.20 0.299 0.299 
6.0 6.0 0.06 0.40 75 0.20 0.297 0.297 
6.0 6.0 0.08 0.40 75 0.20 0.295 0.295 
6.0 6.0 0.12 0.40 75 0.20 0.292 0.292 
6.0 6.0 0.16 0.40 75 0.20 0.289 0.289 
— varying tau — 
6.0 6.0 0.08 0.08 75 0.20 0.13 0.13 
6.0 6.0 0.08 0.24 75 0.20 0.23 0.23 
6.0 6.0 0.08 0.40 75 0.20 0.29 0.29 
6.0 6.0 0.08 0.575 75 0.20 0.35 0.35 
6.0 6.0 0.08 0.74 75 0.20 0.39 0.39 
— varying T — 
6.0 6.0 0.08 0.40 5 0,20 0.310 0.310 
6.0 6.0 0.08 0.40 25 0.20 0.297 0.297 
6.0 6.0 0.08 0.40 75 0.20 0.295 0.295 
6.0 6.0 0.08 0.40 125 0.20 0.295 0.295 
6.0 6.0 0.08 0.40 150 0.20 0.295 0.295 
6.0 6.0 0.08 0.40 300 0.20 0.295 0.295 
— varying sigma — 
6.0 6.0 0.08 0.40 75 0.12 0.17 0.17 
6.0 6.0 0.08 0.40 75 0.14 0.20 0.20 
6.0 6.0 0.08 0.40 75 0.16 0,23 0.23 
6.0 6.0 0.08 0.40 75 0.18 0,26 0.26 
6.0 6.0 0.08 0.40 75 0.20 0.29 0.29 
6.0 6.0 0.08 0.40 75 0.22 0.32 0.32 
6.0 6.0 • 0.08 0.40 75 0.24 0.35 0.35 
6.0 6.0 0.08 0.40 75 0.26 0.38 0.38 
6.0 6.0 0.08 0.40 75 0.28 0.41 0.41 
6.0 6.0 0.08 0.40 75 0.30 0.44 0.44 
6.0 6.0 0.40 0.40 75 0.40 0.59 0.59 
6.0 6.0 0.40 0.40 75 0.50 0.73 0.73 
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the model, premiums for put and call options were calculated. The 
futures price was held constant at $6.0/bu; the strike price, interest 
rate, time to expiration, number of iterations, and the volatility of the 
futures price were each changed separately. 
As can be seen, the model is very sensitive to the strike price, and 
to the futures price volatility (SIGMA). A $0.50/bu increase in the 
strike price, with all else constant, results in a $0.19/bu increase in 
the premium for out-of-the-money put options and a $0.32/bu increase in 
the premium for in-the-money put options. An opposite situation holds 
with respect to calls. A $0.50/bu increase in the strike price, all else 
constant, results in a $0.30/bu reduction in the premium for in-the-money 
call options and a $0.17/bu reduction for out-of-the-money call options. 
An increase in SIGMA by 0.10 increased the option premiums by about 
$0.15/bu. The intuition behind the positive relationship between 
volatility and options premium is that, other things being equal, as the 
futures price becomes more volatile, the expected value of the option at 
expiration increases (i.e., other things remaining the same, the more 
volatile that the futures price is, the more likely that an at-the-money 
option may become an in-the-money option). Time remaining until option 
expiration also had an impact on the premium, decreasing it by $0.26/bu 
as maturity neared from nine months to one month. This indicates that, 
ceteris paribus, options premiums erode as time passes by. At the 
expiration date, there is no time value left, and the premiums are equal 
to the option's intrinsic value. A change in the riskless interest rate 
by four percent (i.e., 8 to 12 percent) changed the premium by $0.003/bu 
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in the opposite direction. More support was offered for using no more 
than 75 iterations because basically the premiums did not change as the 
number of iterations went from 75 to 300; however, the premium changed 
below 75 iterations. 
The model requires the annual volatility of the rate of change in 
the futures price in order to estimate the option premium. The rate of 
change in the futures price (R^) is defined as; 
\ = VVl • (4.18) 
The natural logarithm of + 1 was used to convert this to an 
approximate continuously compounded rate of change. Thus, the first 
differences of the natural logarithms of the daily closing prices for the 
corresponding soybean futures price were used to estimate the rate of 
change in the futures price. Then, the standard deviation of the first 
differences over an historical period were calculated (the choice of 
historical period is discussed next). The annual standard deviations of 
the rate of change in the soybean futures price were calculated by 
multiplying the daily standard deviations by the square root of 250 (the 
approximate number of trading days per year). 
Theoretically, the annualized standard deviation of the rate of 
change in futures prices (to be used in the option pricing model) is the 
expected volatility of the futures price over the remaining life of the 
option. For example, six months prior to maturity an option would have 
associated with it a premium reflecting the expected volatility of prices 
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over the next six months. Historical variance was used as an estimate of 
the expected volatility. 
Seven different methods were used to calculate historical variance: 
1) the price volatility for the corresponding futures contract for the 
previous three months (for example, if in early November we buy March 
option contracts, then we look at volatility of March futures over the 
months of August, September, and October), 2) current or actual price 
volatility of the corresponding futures contract (e.g., if at mid-March 
we buy November options, then we look at volatility of November futures 
over the life of the option), 3) the price volatility for the 
corresponding futures contract over the same period the previous year, 
4) the moving average of the current year and the previous two years' 
volatilities for the same period, 5) the moving average of the previous 
three years' volatilities for the same period, 6) the weighted moving 
average of the current and the previous two years' volatilities for the 
same period, and 7) the weighted moving average of the previous three 
years' volatilities for the same period. In method 5, weights used were 
0.57 for the current year, 0.33 for the previous year, and 0.10 for the 
year prior to that. In method 7, the weights used were 0.57 for one year 
lagged, 0.33 for two years previous, and 0.10 for three years prior to 
the year being considered (the weights were chosen to decline 
geometrically in importance in each previous year). The first method 
would most closely model the expectations if the market participants 
assumed that the most recent (previous three months) volatility would 
continue over the duration of the option contract. The second method 
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implicitly assumes that market participants have a good foresight or are 
very good forecasters so that they are able to track down actual 
volatility fairly correct. Methods 4 and 6 not only take into account 
the current actual volatility but also the previous two years' 
volatilities too. Methods 3, 5, and 7 are long-term expectations that 
prices will remain at the same volatility level this period as was true 
for prior years. 
An efficient method to test the variance estimates is to compute the 
implied volatilities from the model and compare these directly with the 
historical volatilities. That is, during the later part of 1984 and all 
of 1985 the data requirements of the option pricing model are all known 
except for the volatility. However, since the option premiums are also 
known, one can solve for the implied volatilities. 
Implied volatilities were calculated daily for five call and five 
put options (i.e., for each type of option, two out of the money, two in 
the money, and one nearest to at the money options) using actual soybean 
option premiums traded during later parts of 1984 and 1985. The implied 
volatilities were calculated for November option contracts purchased at 
early March, May, June, and July of 1985, plus March and July options 
contracts purchased at November of 1984 and November of 1985. These 
options contracts represent contracts maturing in 9, 7, 5, 4, and 3 
months. These implied volatilities were then averaged over their 
corresponding trading months and compared to the historical volatilities 
calculated by the seven methods previously discussed. The average 
implied and historical volatilities are shown in Table 4.2. The 
Table 4.2. Average implied and historical futures price volatilities for 
selected contracts 
Implied volatilities 
Year 
iraaing 
month Contract IMPl* IMP2^ IMP3C IMP4d IMP 5® IMP6^ IMP78 
1985 March Nov. 14.81 15.38 15.76 16.29 17.06 15.53 15.68 
1985 May Nov. 15.94 16.93 17.55 18.57 19.52 15.96 16.76 
1985 June Nov. 17.33 18.40 19.24 20.88 22.29 17.87 18.56 
1985 July Nov. 17.63 17.39 17.99 19.71 21.61 18.15 17.43 
1984 Nov. March 23.04 21.88 22.16 22.38 23.04 22.28 21.29 
1985 Nov. March 13.98 13.71 14.12 14.73 15.60 14.64 14.26 
1984 Nov. July , 19.30 20.40 20.12 20.05 20.31 - 20.26 
1985 Nov. July 12.74 13.13 13.35 13.92 14.64 13.33 13.03 
*INP1 is the average daily implied volatility for highest 
in-the-money calls over the trading month. 
IMP2 is the average daily implied volatility for lowest 
in-the-money calls over the trading month. 
^IMP3 is the average daily implied volatility for nearest 
at-the-money calls over the trading month. 
IMP4 is the average daily implied volatility for lowest 
out-of-the-money calls over the trading month. 
®IMP5 is the average daily implied volatility for highest 
out-of-the-money calls over the trading month. 
IMP6 is the average daily implied volatility for highest 
out-of-the-money puts over the trading month. 
®IMP7 is the average daily implied volatility for lowest 
out-of-the-money puts over the trading month. 
IMPS is the average daily implied volatility for nearest 
at-the-money puts over the trading month. 
^IMP9 is the average daily implied volatility for lowest 
in-thg-money puts over the trading month. 
IMP 10 is the average daily implied volatility for highest 
in-the-money puts over the trading month. 
^HVOLl is the average volatility in the previous three months. 
HV0L2 is the average current or actual volatility over the duration 
of the option contract. 
^HV0L3 is the average volatility for the previous year over the 
duration of the option contract. 
%V0L4 is the moving average of the current and previous two years' 
volatilities over the duration of the option contract. 
°HV0L5 is the moving average of the previous three years' 
volatilities over the duration of the option contract. 
PhV0L6 is the weighted moving average of the current previous two 
years' volatilities over the duration of the option contract. 
^HVOL? is the weighted moving average of the previous three years' 
volatilities over the duration of the option contract. 
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Implied volatilities Historical volatilities 
IMPsh IMP9^ IMP10j HVOLl^ HV0L2^ HV0L3'" HV0L4" HV0L5° HV0L6P HV0L79 
15.48 15.45 15.34 12.78 16.70 25.32 23.58 23.69 20.75 25.62 
17.55 17.92 18.16 12.43 17.85 29.13 26.28 26.17 22.97 28.87 
19.45 21.19 21.37 15.13 17.87 31.38 27.87 27.68 23.98 30.96 
18.01 19.20 19.38 18.56 15.52 28.44 26.90 27.66 21.90 30.12 
21.81 22.26 21.63 23.91 19.43 24.78 21.03 18.72 21.59 21.16 
13.83 14.32 14.31 13.47 16.03 15.66 17.81 17.63 16.48 17.65 
20.40 20.00 - 23.21 15.57 25.55 18.05 17.66 18.61 20.30 
12.90 13.09 12.90 12.75 18.18 13.44 18.04 15.50 17.05 16.14 
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performance of the seven historical variances are shown in Tables 4.3 and 
4.4. Performance of historical futures price volatilities in 
approximating implied volatilities by each individual selected contract 
(shown in Table 4.3) reveals stronger performance almost from all 
statistical categories (e.g., ME, MAE, RMSE, and RMSPE) standpoint for 
the current volatility (HV0L2), previous 3-month volatility (HVOLl), and 
weighted moving average of the current and previous two years' 
volatilities over the duration of the option contract (HV0L6), relative 
to the rest of the historical volatilities. Overall, for November 
contracts purchased in different months, current volatility (HV0L2) 
performed better than the previous 3-month volatility (HVOLl) which was 
superior to weighted moving average of the current and previous two 
years' volatilities (HV0L5). In terms of other contracts (e.g., 
contracts purchased at harvest time in November), previous 3-month 
volatility (HVOLl), weighted moving average of the current and previous 
two years' volatilities (HV0L6), and the previous year's volatility 
(HV0L3) had stronger performance relative to other historical 
volatilities. If we discard contracts purchased in 1984 because the 
option market was new and not very well established, then previous 
3-month volatility (HVOLl) and previous year volatility (HV0L3) have 
shown similar performance which was superior relative to other 
volatilities in approximating implied volatilities. 
The conclusion from Table 4.4 which represents performance of 
historical volatilities in approximating implied volatilities once all 
selected contracts are considered together is that current volatility 
Table 4.3. Performance of historical futures price volatilities in approximating inçlied 
volatilities, by each individual selected contract 
— Volatilities^ — 
Year Trading month Contract Statistics HVOLl HV0L2 HV0L3 HV0L4 HV0L5 HV0L6 HV0L7 
1985 March Nov. ME^ -2.91 1.02 9.64 7.90 8.01 5.07 9.94 
MAE^ 0.185 0.07 0.57 0.50 0.50 0.31 0.65 
RMSE° 2.97 1.17 9.65 7.92 8.03 5.10 9.95 
RMSPE® 0.18 0.07 0.62 0.50 0.51 0.32 0.63 
1985 May- Nov. ME -5.05 0.36 11.64 8.79 8.68 5.48 11.38 
MAE 0.28 0.05 0.67 0.50 0.50 0.31 0.65 
RMSE 5.16 1.13 11.69 8.85 8.75 5.58 11.43 
RMSPE 0.28 0.06 0.58 0.51 0.51 0.32 0.56 
1985 June Nov. ME -4.52 -1.78 11.72 8.21 8.02 4.32 11.30 
MAE 0.22 0.09 0.60 0.42 0.41 0.22 0.58 
RMSE 4.80 2.39 11.82 8.36 8.17 4.60 11.41 
RMSPE 0.23 0.11 0.62 0.44 0.43 0.24 0.59 
1985 July Nov. ME 0.01 -3.13 9.79 8.25 9.01 3.25 11.47 
MAE 0.05 0.16 0.53 0.44 0.49 0.18 0.62 
RMSE 1.25 3.37 9.87 8.34 9.09 3.48 11.53 
RMSPE 0.05 0.17 0.54 0.45 0.49 0.19 . 0.53 
1984 Nov. March ME 1.73 -2.74 2.60 -1.14 -3.45 -0.58 -1.01 
MAE 0.078 0.12 0.11 0.05 0.15 0.028 0.04 
RMSE 1.81 2.8 2.65 1.25 3.5 0.79 1.14 
RMSPE 0.08 0.125 0.12 0.05 0.15 0.03 0.05 
^Definitions of volatilities are the same as given in Table 4.2. 
ME: mean error. 
^MAE: mean-absolute error. 
RMSE: root-mean-squared error. 
®RMSPE; root-mean-squared-percent error. 
Table 4.3. continued 
— Volatilities — 
Year Trading month Contract Statistics HVOLl HV0L2 HV0L3 HV0L4 HV0L5 HV0L6 HV0L7 
1985 Nov. March ME -0.88 1.68 1.31 3.46 3.28 2.13 3.3 
MAE 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.24 0.23 0.15 0.23 
RMSE 1.02 1.75 1.40 3.5 3.32 2.19 3.34 
RMPSE 0.06 0.12 0.10 0.24 0.23 0.15 0.23 
1984 Nov. July ME 3.10 -4.53 5.44 -2.05 -2.44 -1.49 0.19 
MAE 0.15 0.22 0.27 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.01 
RMSE 3.12 4.54 5.45 2.08 2.46 1.53 0.38 
RMSPE 0.15 0.22 0.27 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.02 
1985 Nov. July ME -0.55 4.87 0.13 4.73 2.19 3.74 2.83 
MAE 0.04 0.36 0.035 0.35 0.16 0.28 0.21 
RMSE 0.77 4.90 0.56 4.76 2.26 3.78 2.88 
RMSPE 0.05 0.37 0.04 0.36 0.17 0.28 0.22 
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Table 4.4. Performance of historical futures price volatilities in 
approximating implied volatilities across all selected 
contracts 
— Volatilities* — 
HVOLl HV0L2 HV0L3 HV0L4 HV0L5 HV0L5 HV0L7 
ME^ -1.24 -0.43 6.56 4.94 4.33 2.84 6.33 
MAE° 0.135 0.15 0.37 0.33 0.33 0.20 0.38 
RMSE^ 3.05 3.02 8.01 6.41 6.44 3.79 8.12 
RMSPE® 0.16 0.18 0.45 0.38 0.37 0.23 0.46 
^Definitions of volatilities are the same as given in Table 4.2. 
^ME: mean error. 
"^MAE: mean-absolute error. 
"^RMSE: root-mean-square error. 
®RMSPE: root-mean-square-percent error. 
83 
(HV0L2) and previous 3-month volatility (HVOLl) have similar performance 
(though HV0L2 performs marginally better) and weighted moving average of 
the current and previous two years' volatility (HV0L6) standed next. The 
overall picture out of Tables 4.3 and 4.4 indicate a stronger performance 
for current volatility (HV0L2) and previous 3-month volatility (HVOLl) in 
approximating implied volatilities. 
The next step was to use estimates of historical current volatility 
(HV0L2) and previous 3-month volatility (HVOLl) in the option model and 
then test for their ability to track option premiums during short time 
periods which options have been traded. This was done by estimating 
option premiums for later parts of 1984 and 1985, using current 
volatility (HV0L2) and previous 3-month volatility (HVOLl), and then 
comparing the estimated option premiums from these two methods to the 
actual premiums. 
The actual put and call option prices and estimated put and call 
option prices using historical volatilities HVOLl and HV0L2 for selected 
contracts are presented in Table 4.5. Accuracy of these two historical 
volatilities in estimating option premiums in comparison to actual 
premiums was tested for all eight selected contracts, for pre-harvest 
contracts only (e.g., November contract purchased at mid-March, mid-May, 
mid-June, and mid-July), and for post-harvest contract only (e.g., March 
and July contracts purchased at early November). These results are shown 
in Tables 4.6 through 4.8. Examination of results of Tables 4.6 through 
4.8 indicate that when only pre-harvest contracts are considered, current 
volatility (HV0L2) performs much stronger than previous 3-month 
Table 4.5. Actual put and call option prices and estimated put and call option prices using 
historical volatilities, HV0L2^ and HVOLl, for selected contracts 
With HV0L2 With HVOLl 
Strike Actual Actual Estimated Estimated Estimated Estimated 
Trading Trading price put call put call put call 
Year month day Contract ($/bu) ($/bu) ($/bu) ($/bu) ($/bu) ($/bu) ($/bu) 
1985 March 15 Nov. 5.50 0.10 — 0.11 0.559 . 0.06 0.51 
5.75 0.18 0.38 0.195 0.40 0.13 0.336 
6.0^ 0.292 0.256 0.309 0.27 0.24 0.20 
6.25 0.436 0.17 0.458 0.179 0.394 0.114 
6.50 0.62 0.11 0.635 0.11 0.58 0.059 
1985 May 15 Nov. 5.25 0.044 — 0.054 0.66 0.016 0.62 
5.50 0.106 0.47 0.113 0.47 0.052 0.41 
5.75C 0.214 0.32 0.205 0.318 0.129 0.24 
6.0 0.34 0.214 0.335 0.204 0.257 0.125 
6.25 0.50 0.14 0.499 0.12 0.43 0.056 
1985 June 15 Nov. 5.25 0.08 0.52 0.067 0.505 0.043 0.48 
5.50 0.17 0.37 0.14 0.33 0.109 0.30 
5.75C 0.30 0.25 0.258 0.20 0.22 0.168 
6.0 0.46 0.174 0.415 0.11 0.385 0.08 
6.25 0.65 0.12 0.608 0.059 0.585 0.036 
1985 July 15 Nov. 5.25 0.036 0.44 0.021 0.54 0.038 0.559 
5.50 0.094 0.37 0.067 0.34 0.096 0.369 
5.75C 0.206 0.224 0.16 0.187 0.197 0.22 
6.0 0.374 0.15 0.31 0.088 0.34 0.12 
6.25 0.56 0.095 0.505 0.035 0.528. 0.0595 
^HV0L2 is the current volatility over the duration of the option contract. 
HVOLl is the volatility in the previous three months. 
^Strike prices corresponding to the nearest at-the-money options. 
Table 4.5. continued 
With HV0L2 With HVOLl 
Strike Actual Actual Estimated Estimated Estimated Estimated 
Trading Trading price put call put call put call 
Year month day Contract ($/bu) ($/bu) ($/bu) ($/bu) ($/bu) ($/bu) ($/bu) 
1984 Nov. 1 March 6.0 0.074 — 0.062 0.628 0.103 0.669 
6.25 0.134 0.474 0.126 0.445 0.177 0.497 
6.50C 0.254 0.334 0.224 0.297 0.284 0.357 
6.75 0.36 0.222 0.359 0.186 0.419 0.246 
7.0 — 0.136 0.53 0.11 0.58 0.16 
1985 Nov. 1 March 5.0 0.03 0.414 0.041 0.436 0.024 0.42 
5.25 0.09 0.24 0.11 0.258 0.084 0.23 
5.50C 0.202 0.114 0.23 0.134 0.204 0.106 
5.75 0.394 0.05 0.405 0.059 0.385 0.039 
6.0 — 0.02 0.617 0.02 0.606 0.011 
1984 Nov. 1 July 6.25 - — 0.143 0.52 0.275 0.65 
6.50 0.32 0.46 0.235 0.37 0.38 0.518 
6.75C 
- 0.344 0.362 0.255 0.51 0.40 
7.0 - 0.254 0.517 0.167 0.658 0.309 
7.25 — 0.20 0.697 0.104 • 0.824 0.23 
1985 Nov. 1 July 5.0 0.037 — 0.097 0.63 0.038 0.58 
5.25 0.09 0.384 0.17 0.468 0.09 0.389 
5.50^ 0.186 0.246 0.279 0.33 0.188 0.24 
5.75 0.324 0.142 0.415 0.224 0.326 0.136 
6.0 0,504 0.082 0.58 0.146 0.505 0.069 
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Table 4.6. Accuracy of previous 3-month volatility (HVOLl) and current 
volatility over the duration of the option contract (HV0L2) 
in tracking option premiums for selected pre-harvest and 
post-harvest contracts 
Accuracy of HVOLl 
and HV0L2 in 
estimating put 
premiums 
Accuracy of HVOLl 
and HV0L2 in 
estimating call 
premiums 
Accuracy of HVOLl 
and HV0L2 in 
estimating put 
and call premiums 
ME(l)a -2.04 -1.29 -1.66 
ME(2)b 0.15 -0.76 -0.31 
MAE(1)° 0.18 0.237 0.21 
MAa(2)d 0.21 0.23 0.22 
RMSE(l)® 4.41 5.61 5.06 
RMSE(2)f 4.24 5.28 4.80 
RMSPE(1)S 0.24 0.33 0.295 
RMSPE(2)h 0.36 0.31 0.338 
^ME(l) is the mean error in tracking option premiums with HVOLl as a 
measure of volatility. 
^ME(2) is the mean error in tracking option premiums with HV0L2 as a 
measure of volatility. 
^MAE(l) is the mean absolute error in tracking option premiums with 
HVOLl as a measure of volatility. 
^MAE(2) is the mean absolute error in tracking option premiums with 
HV0L2 as a measure of volatility. 
®RMSE(1) is the root mean squared error in tracking option premiums 
with HVOLl as a measure of volatility. 
^RMSE(2) is the root mean squared error in tracking option premiums 
with HV0L2 as a measure of volatility. 
SRMSPE(I) is the root mean squared percent error in tracking option 
premiums with HVOLl as a measure of volatility. 
^RMSPE(2) is the root mean squared percent error in tracking option 
premiums with HV012 as a measure of volatility. 
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Table 4.7. Accuracy of previous 3-month volatility (HVOLl) and current 
volatility over the duration of the option contract (HV0L2) 
in tracking option premiums for pre-harvest (growing season) 
contracts 
Accuracy of HVOLl 
and HV0L2 in 
estimating put 
premiums 
Accuracy of HVOLl 
and HV0L2 in 
estimating call 
premiums 
Accuracy of HVOLl 
and HV0L2 in 
estimating put 
and call premiums 
ME(1)* -4.57 -4.55 -4.56 
ME (2) -1.45 -0.96 -1.22 
MAE(l) 0.22 0.285 0.25 
MAE(2) 0.125 0.197 0.16 
RMSE(l) 5.23 6.62 5.93 
RMSE(2) 3.01 4.50 3.8 
RMSPE(l) 0.28 0.34 0.31 
RMSPE(2) 0.16 0.28 0.23 
^Definitions of statistics are the same as those given in 
Table 4.6. 
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Table 4.8. Accuracy of previous 3-month volatility (HVOLl) and current 
volatility over the duration of the option contract (HV0L2) 
in tracking option premiums for post-harvest contracts 
Accuracy of HVOLl 
and HV0L2 in 
estimating put 
premiums 
Accuracy of HVOLl 
and HV0L2 in 
estimating call 
premiums 
Accuracy of HVOLl 
and HV0L2 in 
estimating put 
and call premiums 
ME(1)* 1.57 2.15 1.89 
ME (2) 2.44 -0.55 0.80 
MAE(l) 0.11 0.18 0.15 
MAE(2) 0.34 0.26 0.299 
RMSE(l) 2.85 4.29 3.71 
RMSE(2) 5.54 6.01 5.80 
RMSPE(l) 0.167 0.33 0.27 
RMSPE(2) 0.53 0.33 0.43 
^Definitions of statistics are the same as those given in 
Table 4.6. 
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volatility (HVOLl) in tracking option premiums. When only post-harvest 
contracts are considered, the reverse situation holds, i.e., previous 
3-month volatilty (HVOLl) does a better job in tracking option premiums 
than current volatility (HV0L2). When both pre-harvest and post-harvest 
contracts are considered together, the result is mixed, though current 
volatility performs marginally better. 
Based on this analysis, the average volatility of futures prices in 
the previous three months (HVOLl) was used as an estimate of the expected 
volatility in the option pricing model for post-harvest option contracts, 
and average current (actual) volatility of futures prices over the 
duration of the option contract (HV0L2) was used as an expected 
volatility in the option pricing model for pre-harvest (growing season) 
option contracts. Historical option prices for the nearest at-the-money 
puts and calls of selected pre-harvest and post-harvest contracts for the 
period 1972 through 1985 were estimated by using the CRR model. These 
estimated option prices (given in Table 4.9) which have incorporated in 
them the effects of government loan rates will be used in estimation of 
returns to option strategies which will be developed in the next 
chapter. 
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Table 4.9. Estimated option prices for nearest at-the-money puts and 
calls of selected pre-harvest and post-harvest contracts over 
the period 1972-1985 
Estimated puts Estimated calls 
Year Trading month Contract ($/bu) ($/bu) 
1972 3 Nov. 0.07 
5 Nov. 0.14 0.22 
6 Nov. 0.11 
7 Nov. 0.10 
11 March 0.05 
11 July 0.207 
1973 3 Nov. 0.297 
5 Nov. 0.34 0.386 
5 Nov. 0.42 
7 Nov. 0.518 
11 March 0.39 
11 July 0.51 
1974 3 Nov. 0.568 
5 Nov. 0.42 0.33 
6 Nov. 0.31 
7 Nov. 0.32 
11 March 0.565 
11 July 0.718 
1975 3 Nov. 0.45 
5 Nov. 0.37 0.33 
6 Nov. 0.37 
7 Nov. 0.30 
11 March 0.277 
11 July 0.507 
1976 3 Nov. 0.41 
5 Nov. 0.348 0.466 
6 Nov. 0.51 
7 Nov. 0.41 
11 March 0.35 
11 July 0.58 
1977 3 Nov. 0.618 
5 Nov. 0.60 0.63 
6 Nov. 0.50 
7 Nov. 0.33 
11 March 0.28 
11 July 0.48 
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Table 4.9. continued 
Estimated puts Estimated calls 
Year Trading month Contract ($/bu) ($/bu) 
1978 3 Nov. 0.42 
5 Nov. 0.328 0.32 
6 Nov. 0.328 
7 Nov. 0.316 
11 March 0.355 
11 July 0.44 
1979 3 Nov. 0.406 
5 Nov. 0.46 0.39 
6 Nov. 0.398 
7 Nov. 0.30 
11 March 0.23 
11 July 0.42 
1980 3 Nov. 0.46 
5 Nov. 0.367 0.39 
6 Nov. 0.43 
7 Nov. 0.40 
11 March 0.51 
11 July 0.71 
1981 3 Nov. 0.41 
5 Nov. 0.34 0.38 
6 Nov. 0.356 
7 Nov. 0.31 
11 March 0.22 
11 July 0.27 
1982 3 Nov. 0.35 
5 Nov. 0.28 0.305 
6 Nov. 0.275 
7 Nov. 0.22 
11 March 0.14 
11 July 0.277 
1983 3 Nov. 0.49 
5 Nov. 0.42 0.49 
6 Nov. 0.35 
7 Nov. 0.43 
11 March 0.58 
11 July 0.78 
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Table 4.9. continued 
Estimated puts Estimated calls 
Year Trading month Contract ($/bu) ($/bu) 
1984 3 Nov. 0.508 
5 Nov. 0.466 0.53 
6 Nov. 0.53 
7 Nov. 0.28 
11 March 0.28 
11 July 0.458 
1985 3 Nov. 0.31 
5 Nov. 0.205 0.318 
6 Nov. 0.26 
7 Nov. 0.16 
11 March 0.205 
11 July 0.188 
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CHAPTER 5. SIMULATION PROCEDURES AND RESULTS 
To evaluate the returns from hedging and the use of options by 
soybean farmers, a computerized simulation model was developed to aid in 
the estimation of net returns per bushel for soybeans marketed under 
various strategies. The model was designed to simulate the implication 
of hedging strategies for a typical medium or large soybean producing 
operation in Northcentral Iowa. The model was general enough, though, 
that results should be relevant for most Midwestern soybean producers who 
face prices or relative price patterns similar to those in this area. 
Simulation Assumptions and Procedures 
The simulation period covered the 1975-85 crop years for North-
central Iowa. It is assumed that the production decision has been made, 
and the producer is going to have soybeans for harvest and delivery at 
the end of the growing season. Marketing strategies are developed for 
harvest and post-harvest delivery. For pre-harvest strategies, the 
delivery date is predetermined as November 1. For post-harvest 
strategies it was assumed that the crop was put into commercial storage 
on November 1, and that it could be delivered any time after November 1, 
but that delivery would be completed by July 15 of the year following 
production. The November futures contract was used for pre-harvest 
strategies, and March and July futures contracts were used for post-
harvest strategies. No deliveries on the futures market were considered, 
i.e., futures contracts are offset before they reach their expiration 
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date. Hedges and options were placed on the contract of the month 
closest to the marketing month. All hedges were lifted before the 
corresponding cash transaction occurred. Hedges and options were placed 
based upon the signals specified under each strategy. 
Iowa State University Cooperative Extension Service estimated costs 
of soybean production in Iowa were used. These were annual cost 
estimates for representative medium and large farms in Central Iowa which 
include costs of machinery, seed, chemicals, labor, and cash rent 
equivalent cost of land. Actual price data were used in the simulation. 
Futures market prices were daily closing prices for soybeans from the 
Chicago Board of Trade. Cash prices were weekly Northcentral Iowa cash 
soybean prices. 
Futures transaction brokerage commissions were assumed? to be $60 per 
contract (round turn), which converts to $0.012/bu of soybeans. Broker­
age commissions for options on soybean futures were assumed to be $30 per 
contract for options purchased or sold and $30 per option contract 
exercised, in addition to premiums required to purchase the option. 
Margins for hedging were assumed to be $1,200 per contract for soybeans. 
Margin credits and deposits were ignored based on the presumption that 
the probability of adverse price change and favorable price change were 
the same. Interest charges on margins were the monthly average Produc­
tion Credit Association (PCA) interest rates, from the time of margin 
deposit up until the liquidation of the hedge. Interest on option 
premiums were also based upon monthly average PCA interest rates for the 
period the futures market positions were held. Physical storage costs 
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were calculated at $0.02/bu per month for the number of months stored 
after November 1. To provide internal consistency among all strategies, 
in those cases where soybeans are sold after November 1 (harvest), the 
opportunity costs of storing crops after harvest (rather than selling it 
at harvest in the cash market) — using monthly average PCA interest 
rates — would be subtracted from the return to that strategy. Thus, net 
realized price from any strategy involving post-harvest delivery can be 
directly compared with that of cash sale at harvest strategy. The return 
distributions for alternative strategies were calculated both in terms of 
nominal dollars and also in terms of constant (real) 1982 dollars. This 
adjustment was made by using monthly observations of the Implicit Price 
Deflator for Personal Consumption Expenditures obtained from various 
issues of the Survey of Current Business and Business Statistics. 
Predicted Basis 
One of the fundamental concepts in hedging is localizing the futures 
price to obtain an expected net price from hedging. In order to localize 
a futures price to determine an expected net hedged price, one must have 
an idea of the expected spread between the local cash price and the 
prospective futures price during the period of cash transaction. This 
spread, known as the basis, is an important factor to consider because 
changes in the basis create a dollar for dollar change in the net price 
realized from hedging. A hedger will not know what actual ending basis 
is going to be at the time a hedge is placed; thus, in order to calculate 
a net expected price from hedging, the producer must have an idea of the 
expected basis. 
Methods to predict the basis have ranged from very simplistic, 
assuming it to be zero (Spahr and Sawaya, 1981), a constant amount per 
unit (Davis and Franzmann, 1985, and Shafer, Griffin, and Johnston, 
1978), a moving average of the historical basis (Holt and Brandt, 1984, 
and Hayenga et al., 1984), or more complex econometric and statistical 
models (Barton and Tomek, 1984, and Dole and St. Clair, 1981). Often a 
basis predictor is specified and used in the analysis without testing the 
accuracy of the predictor. The fact that the basis risk in hedging is 
usually much less important than the actual price risk may be much of the 
reason that the basis is frequently not a significant concern (see 
Caldwell, Copeland, and Hawkins, 1982, and Carter and Lyons, 1985, for 
exceptions to this generality). 
The expected basis for soybeans was estimated in this study using a 
simple three-year historical moving average for the period 1972-85. 
Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 contain the actual and expected soybean basis, 
respectively. The accuracy of the three-year moving average basis for 
soybeans is presented in Table 5.3. The predicted soybean basis 
overestimated the actual average basis by more than $0.10/bu less than 27 
percent of the time, and the predicted soybean basis underestimated the 
actual average basis by more than $0.30/bu less than 26 percent of the 
time during 1975-85. 
Table 5.1. Average Northcentral Iowa soybean basis relative to the nearby soybean futures contract 
(C/bu), 1975-85 
Year 
Month 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Jan. 1-14% 27 41 36 31 40 65 68 39 37 21 6 
Jan. 15-31 36 43 40 42 53 68 70 54 52 42 29 
Feb. 25 36 35 44 65 66 62 52 39 27 27 
Mar. 1-14 15 33 39 48 56 58 43 39 23 28 -1 
Mar. 15-31 23 38 47 73 68 74 59 48 35 27 22 
April 19 38 46 61 61 59 47 49 34 31 21 
May 1-14 25 28 36 59 39 50 35 39 26 23 18 
May 15-31 16 32 14 41 53 65 51 46 33 37 13 
June 20 47 20 36 56 64 51 37 22 53 29 
July 1-14 28 55 20 40 56 71 39 27 29 29 24 
July 15-31 36 42 18 32 45 62 33 28 29 -2 32 
Aug. 1-14 17 25 30 42 43 76 44 55 38 11 24 
Aug. 15-31 55 27 4 29 45 50 39 30 50 3 13 
Sept. 1-14 31 31 13 48 41 67 44 28 71 57 19 
Sept. 15-30 33 42 37 51 61 82 64 35 64 21 34 
Oct. 41 45 48 51 77 96 77 29 43 8 25 
Nov. 1-14 29 33 43 52 72 78 58 29 24 23 44 
Nov. 15-30 49 29 37 40 93 63 94 46 -7 45 26 
Dec. 51 10 31 38 88 111 79 48 -11 55 27 
^In contract months, the basis is calculated using the current month's contract for the first 
14 days and using the next nearby futures contract for the remainder of the month. 
Table 5.2. Three-year moving average Northcentral Iowa soybean basis relative to the nearby soybean 
futures contract (C/bu), 1975-85^ 
Year 
Month 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Jan. 1-14^ 26^ 31 35 34 36 36 45 57 57 48 32 
Jan. 15-31 32 39 40 40 42 45 54 64 64 58 49 
Feb. 36 39 39 32 38 48 58 64 60 51 39 
Mar. 1-14 29 28 32 29 40 48 54 52 47 35 30 
Mar. 15-31 27 28 35 36 53 63 72 67 60 48 37 
April 20 20 32 34 48 56 60 56 52 43 38 
May 1-14 22 25 29 30 41 45 49 41 41 33 29 
May 15-31 23 24 27 21 29 36 53 56 54 43 38 
June 26 28 35 29 34 37 52 57 51 37 37 
July 1-14 25 31 39 35 38 39 56 55 46 32 28 
July 15-31 33 44 43 32 31 31 46 47 41 30 18 
Aug. 1-14 25 24 24 24 32 38 54 55 58 45 34 
Aug. 15-31 21 41 37 29 20 26 41 44 40 40 28 
Sept. 1-14 27 37 28 25 31 34 52 51 46 48 52 
Sept. 15-30 17 19 39 37 43 50 65 69 60 54 40 
Oct. 39 44 45 45 48 59 75 83 67 49 26 
Nov. 1-14 37 36 39 35 42 56 67 69 55 37 25 
Nov. 15-30 33 40 39 38 36 57 66 84 68 44 28 
Dec. 29 37 29 31 26 52 79 93 80 38 30 
^The predicted basis is the three-year moving average basis. Basis is defined as: 
basis = futures price - cash price. 
In contract months, the basis is calculated using the current month's contract for the first 
14 days of the month and the next nearby contract month's futures price is used for the remainder of 
the month. 
^To predict (monthly) basis for 1975, actual average basis in 1972 through 1974 was used. 
Also, to predict basis for 1976 and 1977, actual average basis in 1973 through 1975 and 1974 through 
1975 were used, respectively. 
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Table 5.3. Accuracy of the three-year moving average basis predictor for 
Northcentral Iowa soybeans, 1975-85 
Error range 
< -30 -30 to -10 -10 to 10 10 to 30 > 30 
(C/bu) (C/bu) (C/bu) (t/bu) (4/bu) 
(percent) 
25.6 19.2 28.6 20.7 6.0 
Marketing Strategies 
As was indicated in the Literature Review section, profit opportuni­
ties have frequently existed in the soybean futures markets during the 
1975 to 1985 period. More importantly, opportunities to improve returns 
using soybean futures and/or options as compared to the cash market have 
often existed. Marketing strategies that could help signal when these 
improved opportunities may be present or when to forego taking a 
profitable market position if a better opportunities in the future is 
expected would be beneficial to soybean producers. Soybean producers 
have available a number of marketing alternatives in their overall 
marketing plan. Among the decisions facing soybean producers are whether 
to hedge in futures markets or rely on the cash market, and whether to 
consider using the options markets in the risk management strategy. 
Previous studies have shown that routine forward pricing strategies 
typically result in considerably less risk to the producer but lead to a 
lower average return than the cash market. Technical analysis strategies 
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rarely perform as well beyond the original test period. That is, they 
are highly dependent on the period of time being studied. Also, as was 
indicated in the literature review, there have been very few studies 
which use soybean option strategies and these few studies have not 
produced any conclusive results. 
The marketing strategies to be considered in this study are all 
relatively simple, easily understood, and easily implemented by soybean 
farmers. The major purpose is to provide information that is of 
practical relevance to soybean farmers. The strategies to be considered 
include some standard types of strategies; cash marketing, routine 
hedging, selective hedging, and option purchases.^ The following 
marketing strategies were simulated. 
Benchmark strategy 
1. Cash sale at harvest. The sale of soybeans in the cash market at the 
time of harvest, November 1, serves as a benchmark strategy against 
which other strategies are compared. To provide internal consistency 
among all strategies, in those cases where soybeans are sold after 
November 1, the effective prices received will be discounted back to 
November 1. Thus, the net realized price from any strategy involving 
post-harvest delivery can be directly compared with that of the 
benchmark strategy. 
Pre-harvest pricing strategies 
Routine hedge strategies; 
2. The farmer in mid-March (about two months prior to planting time) 
sells November futures contracts equal to 100 percent of his expected 
harvest. The contracts are offset prior to expiration and the beans 
are sold in the cash market on November 1. 
Net returns per bushel equations of cash marketing, routine 
hedging, selective hedging, and option purchasing strategies are provided 
in Appendix B. 
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3. The same as in strategy no. 2, only here the farmer in mid-March 
sells November futures contracts equal to 75 percent of his expected 
harvest. 
4. A period of dry weather in the summer typically threatens yields and 
causes futures contract prices to rally. The farmer takes advantage 
of the price improvement that might come from weather developments by 
selling November futures equal to 25 percent of his expected crop in 
mid-March, 25 percent in early June, and 25 percent in early August. 
The contracts are offset before expiration and the beans are sold on 
November 1. 
5. The farmer in mid-May (planting time) sells November futures 
contracts equal to 100 percent of his expected harvest. The 
contracts are offset prior to expiration and the beans are sold in 
the cash market on November 1. 
6. The same as in strategy no. 5, only now the farmer in mid-May sells 
November futures contracts equal to 75 percent of his expected 
harvest. 
7. The farmer in mid-March sells November futures contracts propor­
tional to 100 percent of his expected harvest, where that proportion 
(the size of futures position) is equal to the optimum hedge 
ratio(s) derived from the price level model (PLM) in Chapter 3. 
8. The same as in strategy no. 7 except now the farmer in mid-March 
sells November futures contracts proportional to 75 percent of his 
expected harvest, where that proportion is equal to the hedge 
ratio(s) from the price level model (PLM). 
9. Similar to strategy no. 4 but here the farmer sells November futures 
proportional to 25 percent of his expected crop in raid-March, 
25 percent of his expected crop in early June, and 25 percent of his 
expected crop in early August. The proportion is equal to the hedge 
ratio derived from the price level model (PLM). The contracts are 
offset before expiration and the beans are sold on November 1. 
10. The same as in strategy no. 7 only here the proportion (the size of 
futures position) is equal to the optimum hedge ratio(s) derived by 
the modified price-difference model (MPDM) in Chapter 3. 
11. The same as in strategy no. 8 only the hedge ratio used here is 
derived by (MPDM) instead of the price level model (PLM). 
12. The same as in strategy no. 9 only the hedge ratio used here is the 
(MPDM) hedge ratio. 
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Selective hedge strategies; 
13. In mid-March, the producer compares his estimated cost of production 
and hedging costs with the localized price of November futures. He 
sells November futures equal to 100 percent of his expected produc­
tion on the first occasion that the localized price exceeds his 
costs by a satisfactory profit margin of $0.25/bu. In the event 
that the localized futures contract price never exceeds his cost-
plus-profit objective, the beans are sold on November 1 in the cash 
market. Futures contracts (if any) are offset shortly before 
expiration and beans are sold in the cash market on November 1. 
14. The same as in strategy no. 13 except the profit margin is increased 
to $0.50/bu. 
15. In mid-March, the producer compares his estimated cost of production 
and hedging costs with the localized price of November futures. He 
sells November futures equal to 75 percent of his expected produc­
tion on the first occasion that the localized price exceeds his 
costs by a profit margin of $0.25/bu. In the event that the 
localized futures contract price never exceeds his cost-plus-profit 
objective, the beans are sold on November 1 in the cash market. 
Futures contracts (if any) are offset shortly before expiration and 
the beans are sold in the cash market on November 1. 
16. The same as in strategy no. 15 only now the profit margin is raised 
to $0.50/bu. 
17. The farmer sells November futures equal to 25 percent of expected 
production on the first day after mid-March that the localized 
futures contract price exceeds his cost of production and his 
hedging costs by $0.25/bu. He sells additional contracts equal to 
25 percent of his expected production when the localized futures 
price exceeds his production and hedging costs by more than 
$0.50/bu. He sells another 25 percent when the localized futures 
price exceeds production and hedging costs by more than $0.75/bu. 
He sells another 25 percent when the localized futures price exceeds 
production and hedging costs by $1.0/bu. Futures contracts are 
offset before expiration and beans are sold on November 1. 
Option strategies: 
18. In mid-March, the farmer buys November at-the-money put options 
equal to 100 percent of his expected production. The options are 
offset (if they have any value) shortly before expiration and beans 
are sold in the cash market on November 1. 
19. Same as strategy no. 18 except that the farmer buys November 
at-the-money puts for 50 percent of the expected crop harvest in 
mid-March and for 50 percent in mid-June. 
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20. Same as strategy no. 18 except that the farmer splits his November 
at-the-money put purchases into 50 percent- in mid-March, 25 percent 
in mid-June, and 25 percent in mid-July. 
21. The same as strategy no. 18 except that in mid-May (planting time) 
the farmer buys November at-the-money put options equal to his 
expected production. 
22. In mid-May, the farmer buys November at-the-money put options for 50 
percent of his expected crop and in mid-July he buys puts for 50 
percent of his expected crop. 
23. In mid-May (planting time) the farmer sells November futures and 
simultaneously purchases at-the-money call options on the same 
futures contracts for 100 percent of his expected production. 
Theoretically, this might be a useful strategy when the futures 
market offers what the farmer considers an especially attractive 
price for delivery of his crop at harvest but he would also like to 
benefit if prices at harvest turn out to be substantially higher. 
Buying the call has the effect of reducing the farmer's down side 
protection by the amount of the premium but allows him to fully 
profit from any price increase greater than the cost of the call. 
It is•interesting to see how this strategy empares to buying puts. 
Post-harvest pricing strategies 
Routine storage strategies: 
24. The farmer stores his soybeans unhedged in a commercial elevator on 
November 1 (when harvest is completed) and sells the entire crop on 
the cash market on February 1. 
25. Same as strategy no. 24 except the crop is sold in mid-July. 
Routine hedging strategies: 
26. The soybeans are stored in a commercial elevator on November 1 and a 
hedge is placed with the March futures contract for 100 percent of 
the beans. The hedge is lifted shortly before the expiration of the 
futures contract and the beans are sold in mid-March in the cash 
market. 
27. Similar to strategy no. 26 except that half of the beans are hedged 
with March futures contracts and half with July contracts. The 
hedge is lifted shortly before contract expiration, and half the 
beans are sold in March, half in July. 
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28. In mid-August (two and one-half months before harvest), March 
futures contracts equal to 75 percent of expected production are 
sold. The contracts are offset shortly before expiration, 25 
percent of beans are sold in November, and 75 percent of beans are 
sold in mid-March. 
29. Same as strategy no. 28 except in the first week of September, 
August futures contracts equal to 75 percent of expected production 
are sold. The contracts are offset shortly before expiration, 25 
percent of beans are sold in November (harvest time) and 75 percent 
of beans are sold in August. 
30. The soybeans are stored in a commercial elevator on November 1 and a 
hedge is placed with the March futures contract proportional to 100 
percent of the beans. The proportion is equal to the optimum hedge 
ratio(s) derived from the price difference model (FDM) in Chapter 3. 
The hedge is lifted shortly before the expiration of the futures 
contract and the beans are sold in mid-March in the cash market. 
Selective hedging strategies: 
31. The producer would begin in June of the growing season to compare 
the localized March futures contract price with his cost of produc­
tion plus hedging and carrying costs. When and if the localized 
futures price exceeds his costs by a desired profit margin of 
$0.25/bu, futures contracts equal to 100 percent of his expected 
production are sold. Futures contracts (if any) are offset shortly 
before expiration and the beans are sold in mid-March. 
32. The same as strategy 31 except that the profit margin is increased 
to $0.50/bu. 
33. The producer would begin in June of the growing season to compare 
the localized March futures contract price with his cost of produc­
tion plus hedging and carrying costs. When and if the localized 
futures price exceeds his costs plus a desired profit margin of 
$0.25/bu, futures contracts equal to 75 percent of his expected 
production are sold. Futures contracts (if any) are offset before 
expiration and the beans are sold in mid-March. 
34. The same as strategy no. 33 except that the profit margin is raised 
to $0.50/bu. 
35. The producer would begin in November (at harvest) to compare the 
localized March futures contract price with his cost of production 
plus hedging and carrying costs. When and if the localized futures 
price exceeds his costs plus a desired profit margin of $0.25/bu, 
futures contracts equal to 100 percent of production are sold. 
Futures contracts (if any) are offset before expiration and the 
beans are sold in mid-March. 
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36. Same as strategy no. 35 except the profit margin is increased to 
$0.50/bu. 
37. The producer would begin in November (at harvest) to compare the 
localized March futures contract price with his cost of production 
plus hedging and carrying costs. When and if the localized futures 
price exceeds his costs plus a desired profit margin of $0.25/bu, 
futures contracts equal to 75 percent of production are sold. 
Futures contracts (if any)a re offset before expiration and the 
beans are sold in mid-March. 
38. Same as strategy no. 37 except the profit margin is raised to 
$0.50/bu. 
39. The producer would begin in June of the growing season to sell March 
futures equal to 25 percent of his expected production on the first 
occasion that the localized March futures contract price exceeds his 
costs of production and hedging and carrying costs by $0.25/bu. He 
He sells additional contracts equal to 25 percent of his expected 
production when and if localized March futures exceed his costs by 
more than $0.50/bu. Another 25 percent of expected production is 
hedged when and if the localized futures price exceeds his costs by 
more than $0.75/bu., and yet another 25 percent when the spread 
between the localized price and costs exceeds $1.0/bu. Futures 
contracts are offset before expiration and beans are sold in the 
mid-March cash market. 
40. Same as strategy no. 39 except the farmer begins in November (at 
harvest) and does follow the same scaling up process as in strategy 
no. 39. 
Option strategies: 
41. The farmer buys at-the-money March put options equal to 100 percent 
of his stored beans at harvest (November 1). The options are offset 
(if they have any value) shortly before their expiration and the 
beans are sold in mid-March. This strategy acts like price 
insurance for farmers. It gives protection against unforeseen 
events which could result in lower rather than higher prices, and 
this protection can be achieved without giving up the opportunity to 
benefit from rising prices. 
42. Similar to strategy no. 41 except half of the options are March 
contracts and half are July contracts. Half of the beans are sold 
in March, half in July. 
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Performance of Alternative Marketing Strategies 
Performance criteria 
The marketing strategies tested are analyzed using a number of 
criteria. The standard mean-variance analysis is performed. Any 
strategy with a higher mean return without having a larger variance of 
returns, or any strategy having a smaller variance without having a 
smaller mean, is unambiguously preferred. The intuitive appeal of mean-
variance analysis is one of its major strengths. Under mean-variance 
criteria, producers are assumed to prefer a strategy yielding an increase 
in profitability (decrease in risk) without an increase in risk (decrease 
in profitability). Thus, mean-variance analysis may result in some 
ambiguity in ranking strategies if they are very similar«in means and 
variances of returns. An additional criterion to analyze the strategies 
IS semi-variance. Semi-variance is the variance of returns only below a 
target value (Markowitz, 1959). If risk is perceived only as variability 
below a target value, then semi-variance is a more appropriate measure of 
risk than tho variance of all returns. 
The semi-variance approach assigns different weights to variability 
above and below a target in order to penalize strategies with revenue 
more dispersed in an unfavorable direction. The mean-semi-variance test 
is similar to mean-variance analysis in that the strategies with lower 
semi-variance and higher means are preferred to those with higher semi-
variance and lower means. Markowitz (1959) defines semi-variance as; 
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SE = 2 
i=l 
n [(r.-E.)"]2 
where (r\-E^) = { 
(r\-E^) for (r\-E^) < = 0 
0 otherwise 
where SE = semi-variance of returns, 
r = actual past returns on the portfolio, 
E = the expected value of returns — or the chosen target value, 
and 
n = number of portfolios being considered. 
In this study, r is the returns generated by the strategy being 
considered and E is set equal to zero implying that only variability in 
returns that are losses will penalize the strategy being considered. 
In this sense, semi-variance is the same as what is known as mean square 
loss (MSL). 
Producers who cannot afford large losses, though do not mind 
variability of profits, should consider the probability of losses 
occurring from implementing a given marketing strategy together with the 
typical volatility of the losses (semi-variance). Thus, semi-variance is 
reported together with mean-variance analysis because the different 
performance measures deserve different emphasis by producers with 
dissimilar risk management situations. 
Results of strategies 
The results of the alternative marketing strategies over the entire 
simulation period of 1975 through 1985 are shown in Table 5.4 (yearly 
analysis of the strategies is presented later). 
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Table 5.4. Performance of alternative marketing strategies over the 
entire simulation period, 1975-85^ 
In current dollars In 1982 dollars^ 
Semi- Semi-
Mean Std. std. Mean Std. std. 
Strategy return dev. dev. return dev. dev. 
Strategy^ number ($/bu) ($/bu) ($/bu) ($/bu) ($/bu) ($/bu) 
Cash at harvest 1 0.076 1.210 0.758 0.206 1.310 0.731 
Pre-harvest 2 0.100 0.698** 0.387* 0.204 0.838* 0.374* 
routine hedge 3 0.094 0.602** 0.419 0.205 0.680** 0.400 
4 0.088 0.713* 0.530 0.225 0.788* 0.505 
5 0.093 0.752* 0.465 0.206 0.898 0.451 
6 0.089 0.654** 0.447 0.206 0.754** 0.423 
7 0.114 0.637** 0.335** 0.216 0.781* 0.325** 
8 0.104 0.586** 0.408 0.213 0.662** 0.391 
9 0.096 0.708* 0.516 0.231 0.782* 0.494 
10 0.096 0.669** 0.364* 0.194 0.807* 0.354* 
11 0.091 0.584** 0.406 0.197 0.659** 0.389 
12 0.082 0.694** 0.513 0.215 0.769* 0.491 
^Indicates significantly different from the cash strategy at the 
0.10 level. 
**Indicates significantly different from the cash strategy at the 
0.05 level. 
^The procedure used for tests concerning means and variances is 
taken from Chapter 7 of Walpole and Myers (1978). The first step was to 
use the following F-test to see if each strategy had significantly 
different variance than the variance of cash strategy. 
Step 1; Null hypothesis : = s|. 
Alternative hypothesis: ^ S?. 
S1 
F = —g, degree of freedom for numerator = n^-l, 
®i 
degree of freedom for denominator = n.-l, 
2 ^2 
where is the variance of the cash strategy, S. is the variance of any 
other strategy, n^ is the number of observations used in calculation of 
mean and variance of the cash strategy, and n^ is the number of 
observations used in calculation of mean and variance of the other 
strategy. 
Step 2; If we accepted the above null hypothesis, then the following 
test was performed for the significance of the means. 
Null hypothesis: = X^. 
Alternative hypothesis; X^ X^. 
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Table 5.4. continued 
In current dollars In 1982 dollars 
Semi- Semi-
Mean Std. std. Mean Std. std. 
Strategy return dev. dev. return dev. dev. 
Strategy number ($/bu) ($/bu) ($/bu) ($/bu) ($/bu) ($/bu) 
Pre-harvest 13 0.134 0.931 0.686 0.267 1.000 0.658 
selective hedge 14 0.140 1.010 0.723 0.306 1.080 0.693 
15 0.120 0.891** 0.686 0.252 0.931 0.658 
16 0.124 0.990 0.723 0.281 1.040 0.693 
17 0.248 1.024 0.700 0.431 1.106 0.981 
Pre-harvest 18 0.189 0.820 0.511 0.309 0.879 0.487 
option purchase 19 0.224 0.857 0.534 0.349 0.914 0.508 
20 0.205 0.875 0.547 0.337 0.942 0.521 
21 0.233 0.866 0.508 0.352 0.950 0.482 
22 0.208 0.919 0.559 0.346 1.000 0.531 
23 -0.279 0.715* 0.664 -0.227 0.793* 0.652 
Post-harvest 24 -0.300 1.110 0.897 -0.182 1.319 0.867 
routine storage 25 -0.300 1.370 1.133 -0.076 1.538 1.082 
(Xi-X.) , 2 (ni-DSf+Cno-DSf 
t = 1 ^ 1 vn where S„ = —^^and the degree of freedom 
Sp'^ij+ir) ^ ^ 1 i 
for the above (t-test) = (n^ + n^ - 2), where and Xj^ are mean values 
of the cash and the other strategy, respectively. 
Step 3: If we rejected the null hypothesis in step 1, then the following 
test was performed for the significance of the means. Null and 
alternative hypotheses were the same as in step 2. 
SF S? 
(%1-Xi) % + ÏÏT) 
t = —^—g—Y—. Degree of freedom = —^ —2—* 
n^-l n^-1 
Tests concerning serai-variances were similar to those in step 1; only in 
these cases number of observations in the calculation of semi-variances 
were used. All of the above tests were performed at 0.05 and 0.10 levels 
of significance. The results of (t-tests) were the same under both 
one-tailed and two-tailed tests, and none of the strategies had 
significantly different mean than the mean of the cash strategy. 
Deflated by the implicit price deflator for personal consumption 
expenditures (1982=100). 
description of the strategies was given previously in the text. 
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Table 5.4. continued 
In current dollars In 1982 dollars 
Semi- Serai-
Mean Std. std. Mean Std. std. 
Strategy return dev. dev. return dev. dev. 
Strategy number ($/bu) ($/bu) ($/bu) ($/bu) ($/bu) ($/bu) 
Post-harvest 26 0.021 1.215 0.794 0.118 1.274 0.766 
routine hedge 27 -0.084 1.191 0.846 0.000 1.236 0.814 
28 -0.055 1.099 0.814 0.028 1.189 0.794 
29 -0.470 1.043 1.076 -0.469 1.052 1.010 
30 -0.101 1.097 0.820 0.00 1.178 0.790 
Post-harvest 31 0.354 0.815 0.543 0.483 0.901 0.510 
selective hedge 32 0.265 1.075 0.768 0.439 1.125 0.722 
33 0.348 0.842 0.543 0.501 0.967 0.510 
34 0.262 1.089 0.768 0.451 1.168 0.722 
35 0.376 1.567 0.885 0.640 1.835 0.841 
36 0.441 1.578 0.885 0.723 1.844 0.841 
37 0.401 1.566 0.885 0.693 1.868 0.841 
38 0.461 1.576 0.885 0.765 1.876 0.841 
39 0.292 1.023 0.667 0.478 1.117 0.631 
40 0.428 1.572 0.885 0.732 1.901 0.849 
Post-harvest 41 -0.049 1.352 0.870 0.108 1.612 0.844 
option purchase 42 -0.156 1.148 0.884 -0.009 1.249 0.845 
Ill 
The typical Northcentral Iowa farmer relying on the cash market with 
no post-harvest storage would have realized an average nominal return of 
$0.076/bu with a standard deviation of returns of $1.21/bu. The 
$0.076/bu average return to the cash market with no post-harvest storage 
•Is not surprisingly low considering the fact that estimated costs of 
production include seed, fertilizer, chemicals, crop insurance, cash 
rent, hired labor, as well as machinery and operating capital. 
Semi-standard deviation for the cash was $0.758/bu in current dollars. 
The cash average return, standard deviation, and semi-standard deviation 
in constant 1982 dollars were $0.206/bu, $1.31/bu, and $0.731/bu, 
respectively. 
As with most previous studies, the pre-harvest routine hedges all 
yielded a lower variability of nominal returns. All of the 11 
pre-harvested routine strategies examined had significantly lower 
standard deviation of nominal returns than the cash strategy. All but 
three pre-harvest routine hedging strategies yielded higher (though not 
significantly higher) nominal mean returns than the cash strategy. The 
pre-harvest routine hedging strategy which yielded highest nominal 
mean returns than the cash strategy was the one using the price-level 
model (PLM) hedge ratio (e.g., strategy 7). All of the pre-harvest 
routine hedges also had lower semi-standard deviation of nominal 
returns than the cash strategy. Routinely hedging in November futures 
proportional to the (PLM) hedge ratio at raid-March (e.g., strategy 7) 
resulted in the lowest serai-variance of all strategies tested. 
Strategy 11 in which the farmer in raid-March routinely hedges in 
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November futures proportional to 75 percent of his expected crop, where 
that proportion is equal to the hedge ratio(s) from the modified 
price-difference model (MPDM), resulted in the lowest variance of all 
strategies tested. Performance of pre-harvest routine hedging strategies 
in comparison with the cash strategy did change somewhat when constant 
dollars were used. Of 11 pre-harvest routine hedges, four (strategies 2, 
3, 10, and 11) yielded lower average real returns than cash, and all had 
lower standard deviations and semi-standard deviations of real returns. 
The objective of a marketing plan must be spelled out clearly in order to 
determine if the risk reduction is worth the cost of the reduced average 
real returns. All of the pre-harvest selective hedging strategies (e.g., 
strategies 13 through 17) resulted in higher means (nominal and real) and 
lower variances than the cash strategy. Among these, strategy 15, in 
which the farmer selectively hedges 75 percent of expected crops whenever 
the localized November futures price exceeds costs of production and 
hedging costs by a profit margin of $0.25/bu, significantly improved 
variance of net nominal returns. Of pre-harvest selective hedging 
strategies, strategy 17, in which the producer sells futures contracts by 
scaling-up based on costs of production, yielded the highest average 
nominal return ($0.248/bu) and the highest average real return 
($0.43/bu). In pre-harvest selective hedging strategies 13 and 14 or 15 
and 16, as profit margins increased by $0.25/bu both mean return and 
variance increased some. The results of pre-harvest selective strategies 
is more or less in the line with studies done by Nicholes (1984) and 
Drinka and Rogers (1985). Routine put option purchase strategies 18 
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through 22 resulted in higher (though not significantly higher) average 
returns and lower (but not significantly lower) standard derivation of 
returns than the cash strategy, both in nominal and real terras. This is 
a somewhat better result than Nicholes (1984) and Hudson, Hauser, and 
Fortenbery's (1985) results which found that routine options strategy 
resulted in lower mean return and lower variance (in the case of 
Nicholes' (1984)) and higher variance and lower mean return (in the case 
of Hudson, Hauser, and Fortenbery (1985)) than the cash market. Routine 
call purchases and futures sales (e.g., strategy 23) yielded a negative 
mean return but a significantly lower variance than the cash strategy. 
Both post-harvest routine storage strategies 24 and 25 resulted in 
negative nominal and real mean returns. The longer the crop was kept in 
storage the higher was the variance of return to the post-harvest routine 
storage strategy. 
Post-harvest routine hedging strategies 26 through 29 yielded lower 
returns than the cash sale at harvest strategy. Three of these 
strategies (e.g., strategies 27 through 29) resulted in negative nominal 
mean returns, which make them unacceptable to most producers. Routine 
hedge strategy 30, which used the price-difference model (PDM) hedge 
ratio, resulted in negative nominal mean returns and lower variance of 
returns but higher semi-variance of returns than the cash strategy. 
Among post-harvest routine hedging strategies, strategy 26, in which the 
farmer hedges in March futures for 100 percent of the stored beans 
resulted in the lowest semi-standard deviation of nominal and real 
returns. 
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All of the post-harvest selective strategies (strategies 31 through 
40), based on the costs of production, resulted in higher nominal and 
real mean returns than the cash strategy. Strategy 38 — in which the 
producer begins at harvest to compare the localized March futures price 
with his costs of production plus carrying costs and if the localized 
futures price exceeds his costs plus a profit margin of $50.0/bu, futures 
contracts equal to 75 percent of the stored beans are sold — resulted in 
the largest nominal average returns (e.g., $0.461/bu) and also the 
largest real average returns (e.g., $0.765/bu) of any strategy. Of ten 
post-harvest selective strategies tested, strategy 31 — in which the 
farmer starting in June of the growing season selectively hedges 100 
percent of expected crops based on the costs of production — resulted in 
the lowest standard deviation of returns and strategies 31 and 32 yielded 
the lowest semi-standard deviation of returns. Strategies 35, 36, 37, 
38, and 40 yielded higher variances both in nominal and real terms than 
the cash strategy. While the rest of the post-harvest selective hedging 
strategies yielded lower variances than the cash strategy, only 
strategies 31, 33, and 39 resulted in lower semi-standard deviations in 
nominal terms than the cash market. Performance of pre-harvest and 
post-harvest selective hedging strategies were very much similar, though 
pre-harvest selective hedging strategies were marginally more effective 
in reducing risk and increasing returns when compared to the cash 
strategy. 
Both post-harvest routine put option purchases (strategies 41 and 
42) yield the negative nominal mean returns and both had higher semi-
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variances in nominal and real terms than the cash strategy. Strategy 42, 
in which the farmer buys at-the-money March puts for half of the crop and 
for the other half buys July puts, resulted in lower variance of nominal 
and real returns than the cash strategy. The results of post-harvest put 
strategies are consistent with results of Nicholes (1984). Among post-
harvest strategies, selective hedging strategy 38 yielded the highest 
average nominal and real returns, selective hedging strategy 31 yielded 
the lowest standard deviation of nominal and real returns, strategy 39 
yielded the lowest semi-standard deviation of nominal returns, and 
strategies 31 and 33 resulted in the lowest semi-standard deviation of 
real returns. 
Nominal and real net returns of all of the strategies over 
individual years are shown in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. As expected, the 
strategies yielded quite different results over different years. In 
1975, post-harvest selective hedging strategies 35 through 38 and 40 
resulted in the highest nominal net returns of $2.95/bu while the post-
harvest routine put purchase strategy (i.e., strategy 41) yielded the 
highest negative nominal net return of $-0.38/bu. In 1975, the highest 
net return belonged to post-harvest routine put purchase strategy number 
41, while pre-harvest routine hedging strategies 2 and 10 resulted in a 
negative $0.13/bu nominal net return. In 1977, post-harvest cost of 
production strategies 31, 32, and 39 yielded the highest nominal net 
return equal to $1.68/bu and post-harvest routine hedge strategy 29 
resulted in the lowest net return of negative $0.79/bu. In 1978, post-
harvest routine storage strategy 25, and in 1979, post-harvest selective 
Table 5.5. Nominal net returns ($/bu) to alternative marketing strategies by crop year 
Crop year 
Strategy 
Strategy^ number 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Cash 1 0.12 1.47 -0.06 0.91 -0.18 1.71 -0.73 -1.49 1.57 -0.76 -1.72 
Pre-harvest routine 2 0.55 -0.13 1.36 0.11 0.37 -0.37 0.93 -0.55 -0.51 0.21 -0.95 
hedge 3 0.51 0.26 1.00 0.31 0.23 0.14 0.51 -0.79 0.004 -0.03 -1.14 
4 0.57 0.81 0.76 0.38 0.36 0.27 0.09 -0.95 0.37 -0.26 -1.45 
5 0.13 0.39 1.58 0.22 0.57 -0.75 0.42 -0.23 -0.42 0.36 -1.25 
6 0.13 0.66 1.17 0.39 0.38 -0.14 0.13 -0.55 0.07 0.08 -1.36 
7 0.60 -0.10 1.34 0.12 0.43 -0.23 0.77 -0.65 -0.29 0.10 -0.81 
8 0.48 0.28 0.99 0.31 0.27 0.24 0.39 -0.86 0.17 -0.11 -1.03 
9 0.53 0.80 0.76 0.38 0.39 0.36 0.01 -1.01 0.48 -0.33 -1.33 
10 0.55 -0.13 1.34 0.12 0.45 -0.37 0.88 -0.64 -0.48 0.15 -0.80 
11 0.44 0.26 0.99 0.31 0.29 0.14 0.48 -0.85 0.03 -0.07 -1.03 
12 0.49 0.79 0.76 0.38 0.41 0.27 0.06 -1.0 0.37 -0.31 -1.33 
Pre-harvest 13 0.74 0.30 1.32 0.08 0.37 0.06 0.76 -1.49 0.63 0.41 -1.72 
selective hedge 14 0.74 0.62 1.32 0.35 0.37 0.32 0.76 -1.49 1.01 -0.76 -1.72 
15 0.58 0.59 0.97 0.28 0.23 0.47 0.38 -1.49 0.86 0.12 -1.72 
16 0.58 0.83 0.97 0.49 0.23 0.67 0.38 -1.49 1.15 -0.76 -1.72 
17 0.85 0.74 1.32 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.89 -1.49 1.08 -0.46 -1.72 
Pre-harvest option 18 0.21 1.03 0.58 0.46 -0.08 1.20 0.25 -0.92 1.03 -0.30 -1.38 
purchase 19 0.006 1.06 0.64 0.51 0.42 1.22 0.16 -0.87 1.11 -0.31 -1.51 
20 0.15 1.21 0.44 0.51 0.32 1.23 0.18 -0.92 1.09 -0.49 -1.48 
21 -0.19 1.10 0.85 0.56 0.10 1.31 0.09 -0.58 1.11 -0.25 -1.54 
22 0.09 1.40 0.37 0.57 0.32 1.30 0.11 -0.80 1.11 -0.65 -1.54 
23 -0.21 0.18 1.03 -0.05 0.16 -1.15 0.009 -0.50 -0.95 -0.05 -1.51 
description of the strategies was given previously in the text. 
Table 5.5. continued 
Crop year 
Strategy 
Strategy 
number 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Post-harvest 24 -0.29 1.99 -0.18 0.81 -0.05 0.04 -1.07 -1.50 0.16 -1.49 -1.74 
routine storage 25 1.64 1.16 0.23 1.05 0.74 -0.52 -1.58 -0.88 -0.70 -2.29 -2.19 
Post-harvest 26 0.03 1.24 -0.29 0.72 -0.04 1.94 -0.69 -1.59 1.41 -0.63 -1.85 
routine hedge 27 -0.12 1.18 -0.30 0.61 -0.10 1.81 -0.68 -1.72 1.14 -0.83 -1.90 
28 0.90 1.20 -0.64 0.17 0.30 0.62 -0.51 -1.63 1.42 -0.55 -1.90 
29 0.44 0.79 -0.79 -0.08 -0.24 0.36 -1.01 -1.94 0.72 -1.30 -2.15 
30 -0.01 1.42 -0.18 0.68 -0.01 0.88 -0.89 -1.59 1.20 -0.76 -1.84 
Post-harvest 31 0.21 0.64 1.68 0.33 0.54 0.37 0.42 0.53 0.36 0.59 -1.80 
selective hedge 32 0.52 0.64 1.68 0.46 0.54 0.77 0.66 0.53 0.69 -1.80 -1.80 
33 0.12 1.29 1.49 0.58 0.32 0.44 0.10 0.53 0.53 0.21 -1.80 
34 0.36 1.29 1.49 0.68 0.32 0.74 0.28 0.53 0.77 -1.80 -1.80 
35 2.95 1.35 0.14 0.68 0.22 2.20 -1.45 0.53 1.12 -1.80 -1.80 
36 2.95 1.35 1.00 0.68 0.06 2.20 -1.45 0.53 1.12 -1.80 -1.80 
37 2.95 1.82 0.33 0.84 0.08 1.81 -1.45 0.53 1.09 -1.80 -1.80 
38 2.95 1.82 1.00 0.84 0.06 1.81 -1.45 0.53 1.09 -1.80 -1.80 
39 0.62 0.77 1.68 0.57 0.91 0.81 -0.45 0.53 0.76 -1.20 -1.80 
40 2.95 1.35 0.79 0.71 0.10 2.20 -1.45 0.53 0.12 -1.80 -1.80 
Post-harvest 41 -0.38 2.56 0.35 0.61 -0.38 1.64 -0.84 -1.64 0.42 -0.95 -1.92 
option purchase 42 0.35 1.56 0.02 0.57 -0.06 1.38 -0.90 -1.43 0.06 -1.25 -2.03 
Table 5.6. Real net returns ($/bu) to alternative marketing strategies by crop year^ 
Crop year 
strategy 
Strategy number 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Cash 1 0.19 2.22 -0.08 1.20 -0.21 1.87 -0.74 -1.45 1.48 -0.69 -1.51 
Pre-harvest routine 2 1.03 -0.19 1.94 0.14 0.45 -0.41 0.95 -0.54 -0.48 0.19 -0.84 
hedge 3 0.82 0.40 1.43 0.41 0.28 0.15 0.52 -0.77 0.004 -0.02 -1.00 
4 0.91 1.22 1.09 0.50 0.43 0.30 0.09 -0.92 0.34 -0.23 -1.28 
5 0.21 0.59 2.26 0.29 0.70 -0.83 0.43 -0.23 -0.40 0.33 -1.10 
6 0.20 1.00 1.67 0.52 0.47 -0.15 0.13 -0.53 0.06 0.08 -1.20 
7 0.95 -0.16 1.91 0.15 0.52 -0.26 0.78 -0.63 -0.27 0.09 -0.71 
8 0.76 0.43 1.41 0.42 0.33 0.27 0.40 -0.84 0.16 -0.10 -0.91 
9 0.84 1.21 1.08 0.51 0.48 0.40 0.01 -0.98 0.45 -0.30 -1.17 
10 0.87 -0.19 1.91 0.15 0.54 -0.41 0.90 -0.62 -0.45 0.13 -0.71 
11 0.70 0.40 1.41 0.42 0.35 0.16 0.49 -0.83 0.02 -0.06 -0.91 
12 0.78 1.20 1.08 0.51 0.50 0.30 0.07 -0.98 0.35 -0.28 -1.17 
Pre-harvest 13 1.17 0.45 1.89 0.10 0.45 0.07 0.77 -1.45 0.59 0.37 -1.51 
selective hedge 14 1.17 0.94 1.89 0.47 0.45 0.36 0.77 -1.45 0.95 -0.69 -1.51 
15 0.93 0.89 1.39 0.38 0.28 0.52 0.39 -1.45 0.82 0.11 -1.51 
16 0.93 1.26 1.39 0.65 0.28 0.73 0.39 -1.45 1.08 -0.69 -1.51 
17 1.36 1.13 1.89 0.63 0.60 0.56 0.91 -1.45 1.02 -0.42 -1.51 
Pre-harvest option 18 0.33 1.56 0.83 0.61 -0.10 1.32 0.26 -0.89 0.97 -0.27 -1.22 
purchase 19 0.01 1.61 0.92 a. 68 0.51 1.34 0.17 -0.85 1.04 -0.28 -1.33 
20 0.23 1.84 0.63 0.68 0.39 1.35 0.18 -0.89 1.03 -0.45 -1.30 
21 -0.31 1.67 1.22 0.74 0.13 1.44 0.09 -0.57 1.05 -0.22 -1.36 
22 0.14 2.12 0.53 0.75 0.38 1.42 0.11 -0.78 1.05 -0.59 -1.35 
23 -0.33 0.28 1.47 -0.07 0.20 -1.26 0.009 -0.49 -0.89 -0.05 -1.33 
^Returns were delfated by the iraplict price delfator for personal consumption expenditures 
(1982=100). 
A description of the strategies was given previously in the text. 
Table 5.6. continued 
Crop year 
Strategy 
Strategy number 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Post-harvest 24 -0.46 2.96 -0.25 1.06 -0.06 0.04 -1.08 -1.46 0.15 -1.35 -1.53 
routine storage 25 2.55 1.69 0.31 1.32 0.84 -0.54 -1.56 -0.83 -0.64 -2.04 -1.92 
Post-harvest 26 0.05 1.84 -0.41 0.93 -0.05 2.08 -0.69 -1.54 1.31 -0.56 -1.63 
routine hedge 27 -0.19 1.75 -0.42 0.77 -0.12 1.92 -0.67 -1.65 1.06 -0.75 -1.67 
28 1.40 1.76 -0.94 0.17 0.28 0.64 -0.54 -1.59 1.31 -0.51 -1.67 
29 0.63 1.10 -1.18 -0.20 -0.40 0.30 -1.05 -1.89 0.63 -1.19 -1.90 
30 -0.02 2.12 -0.25 0.88 -0.01 0.95 -0.90 -1.54 1.12 -0.69 -1.62 
Post-harvest 31 0.33 0.96 2.35 0.42 0.63 0.40 0.43 0.49 0.34 0.53 -1.59 
selective hedge 32 0.82 0.96 2.35 0.60 0.63 0.83 0.66 0.49 0.64 -1.59 -1.59 
33 0.20 1.92 2.09 0.74 0.37 0.47 0.10 0.49 0.49 0.19 -1.59 
34 0.56 1.92 2.09 0.88 0.37 0.79 0.28 0.49 0.72 -1.59 -1.59 
35 4.40 2.01 0.19 0.87 0.25 2.36 -1.41 0.49 1.04 -1.59 -1.59 
36 4.40 2.01 1.30 0.87 0.06 2.36 -1.41 0.49 1.04 -1.59 -1.59 
37 4.40 2.71 0.47 1.08 0.09 1.94 -1.41 0.49 1.02 -1.59 -1.59 
38 4.40 2.71 1.30 1.08 0.06 1.94 -1.41 0.49 1.02 -1.59 -1.59 
39 0.97 1.15 2.35 0.74 1.07 0.86 -0.45 0.51 0.71 -1.08 -1.59 
40 4.65 2.01 1.11 0.92 0.11 2.36 -1.46 0.51 1.04 -1.62 -1.59 
Post-harvest 41 -0.60 3.81 0.49 0.78 -0.44 1.76 -0.85 -1.59 0.39 -0.86 -1.69 
option purchase 42 0.54 2.32 0.04 0.73 -0.07 1.47 -0.90 -1.38 0.06 -1.12 -1.78 
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strategy 39 in which the producer starts in June of the growing season to 
sell March contracts and scale-up his hedges based on the cost of 
production and other costs, resulted in the highest nominal net return 
of $1.05/bu and $0.91/bu, respectively, while in 1978 post-harvest 
routine hedging strategy 29 and in 1979 post-harvest routine put purchase 
strategy 41 yielded the lowest returns. In 1980, post-harvest routine 
hedging strategy 30 and pre-harvest routine call purchase and selling 
futures strategy 23 resulted in the highest and the lowest nominal net 
returns, respectively. In 1981, pre-harvest routine hedge strategy 2 and 
post-harvest routine storage strategy 25 yielded the highest and the 
lowest returns, respectively. In 1982, all of the post-harvest selective 
strategies based on costs of production (strategies 31 through 40) 
resulted in the highest return of $0.53/bu while strategy 29 yielded the 
worst return of negative $1.94/bu. 
In 1983, the cash strategy resulted in the highest return equal to 
$1.57/bu, which is not a surprising result given the fact that 1983 was a 
short crop year^ and pre-harve option purchase strategy 23 resulted in 
the worst return of negative $0.95/bu. In 1984, post-harvest selective 
costs of production strategy 31 resulted in the highest return of 
$0.59/bu and post-harvest routine storage strategy 25 yielded the lowest 
average return. In 1985, all of the strategies resulted in a loss. 
Given that 1985 was a bumper-crop year and costs of production were high 
also, this was not a far-fetched result. Performance of different 
^In general, a crop year is short when production falls five percent 
or more below the level of crop utilization in the previous year. 
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strategies in terms of their real returns over individual years were 
similar to their performance in nominal terms. 
Ranking of strategies 
Ranking the strategies using mean-variance or mean-semi-variance 
analysis is most easily done by graphing the mean and variance and 
semi-variance of the strategies. The plots of means and variances and 
means and semi-variances (in nominal dollars and in constant 1982 
dollars) of the strategies over the entire simulation period are shown in 
Figures 5.1 through 5.4. 
Strategies which clearly perform better than the cash strategy 
(i.e., strategy 1) are in the upper left quadrant (higher mean, lower 
variance or lower semi-variance) of the graphs, those which are clearly 
inferior to the cash market are in the lower right quadrant (higher 
variance or higher semi-variance, lower mean), and strategies falling in 
the other two quadrants are ambiguous relative to the cash market. The 
strategy in the furthest upper left corner is the most preferred 
strategy. 
In terms of nominal mean-variances of strategies over simulation 
period shown in Figure 5.1, 25 of the strategies tested were unambigu­
ously preferred to the cash market. All pre-harvest routine hedging 
strategies 2 through 12, all pre-harvest selective hedging strategies 13 
through 17, pre-harvest routine put-purchase strategies 18 through 22, 
and post-harvest profit-margin (cost of production) selective hedging 
strategies 31 through 34 and 39 were all clearly preferred to the cash 
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only strategy. Routine storage strategy 25, post-harvest routine hedging 
strategy 25, and post-harvest routine put purchase strategy 41 were 
clearly inferior to the cash only strategy. However, it could be argued 
that strategies with very low average returns would not be preferred by 
most producers. Many of the strategies (12 strategies) ended up being 
neither superior nor inferior to the cash strategy from a nominal mean-
variance analysis standpoint. 
Ranking of marketing strategies in terms of real mean-variance 
analysis is shown in Figure 5.2. The results of ranking more or less was 
the same as ranking of nominal mean-variance analysis. Except here, 
strategies 2, 3, 10, and 11 of pre-harvest routine hedges and post-
harvest routine hedging strategy 26 also fell into the ambiguous cate­
gory, and post-harvest routine storage strategy 24 became inferior to the 
cash only strategy also. Overall, 22 strategies were preferred to the 
cash strategy, three strategies fell into the inferior quadrant (lower 
real mean returns, higher variance of real returns), and the rest of the 
marketing strategies (16) were neither preferred nor inferior to the cash 
strategy. Ranking in terms of nominal means semi-variances is shown in 
Figure 5.3. Here, all those strategies which were preferred (except 
strategies 32 and 34) when the ranking was done with respect to nominal 
mean-variance of strategies (Figure 5.1) still are preferred strategies. 
Post-harvest selective hedging strategies 32 and 34 yielded higher semi-
standard deviation and higher mean returns than the cash strategy and, 
hence, fell into the ambiguous category. Eight strategies (all post-
harvest strategies) performed worse than the cash strategy and fell into 
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the inferior quadrant. Inferior strategies were post-harvest routine 
storage strategies 24 and 25, post-harvest routine hedge strategies 26 
through 29, and post-harvest routine put options purchase strategies 41 
and 42. 
The ranking structure using real mean semi-variance analysis of 
marketing strategies (shown in Figure 5.4) revealed that 22 strategies 
were preferred to the cash at harvest strategy, nine of the post-harvest 
strategies fell into the inferior quadrant, and the rest of the 
strategies fell into the ambiguous category. 
Overall, pre-harvest routine hedging strategies 4 through 9 and 12, 
all of the pre-harvest selective hedging strategies 13 through 17, 
pre-harvest option purchasing strategies 18 through 22, and post-harvest 
selective hedging strategies 31, 33, and 39 were the best consistently 
with regard to all of the,ranking criteria used here. Performances of 
the pre-harvest routine puts purchasing strategies 18 through 22 were 
much better than the post-harvest routine puts purchasing strategies 41 
and 42. Post-harvest routine storage strategy 25 and post-harvest 
routine put purchase strategy 41 had worse performance compared to the 
cash strategy regardless of the criterion using for ranking. 
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CHAPTER 6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
Soybean producers have faced highly variable and frequently low 
returns for decades, and this problem has intensified in recent years, A 
number of marketing alternatives exist which soybean growers can use in 
order to stabilize or increase soybean producing profitability. Futures 
markets and recently introduced options markets are two important such 
marketing alternatives. Relatively little research has been done thus 
far on marketing strategies involving futures and options contracts for 
soybean farmers. The purpose of this study was to partially remedy this 
situation. To achieve this objective, an attempt was made to develop and 
empirically evaluate marketing strategies which soybean producers could 
readily use in order to improve returns or decrease their variability. 
With many marketing alternatives available, soybean producers have a keen 
interest in how to use various marketing alternatives, when to take a 
market position, and how various market alternatives and strategies have 
performed. 
A simulation model was developed in order to test 42 pre-harvest and 
post-harvest marketing strategies for Northcentral Iowa farmers over 
1975-85. The simulation model was used to evaluate routine hedging, 
selective hedging, routine options purchases, and routine storage 
strategies. In all strategies, signals were specified as to when to take 
a market position. Over the entire simulation period, post-harvest 
selective hedging strategies 31, 33 (in which the producer would begin in 
129 
June of the growing season to search for the first occasion when the 
localized March futures price exceeds his(her) hedging and carrying costs 
by. a profit margin of $0.25/bu and, when this signal is met, the producer 
hedges 100 percent (in the case of strategy 31) or 75 percent (in the 
case of strategy 33) of his expected crop, post-harvest selective hedging 
strategy 39 (in which the farmer would begin in June of the growing 
season to sell March futures based on the scale-up cost of production 
sign), pre-harvest selective hedging strategies 13 through 16 (in which 
the farmer after mid-March sells November contracts based on the 
comparison of his estimated cost of production, hedging costs, and some 
profit margin with the localized price of November futures), pre-harvest 
selective hedging strategy 17 (in which the farmer sells November futures 
equal to 25 percent of expected production on the first day after 
mid-March that the localized futures contract price exceeds the expected 
cost of production and the farmer hedging costs by some profit margin and 
he(she) continues scaling-up based on cost of production), and 
pre-harvest routine hedging strategies 4 through 9 and 12 had the 
highest average return of the strategies tested and a lower variance 
reliance on the cash market. In addition, pre-harvest routine put 
purchase strategies 18 through 22 also performed better than the cash at 
the harvest market. Also, pre-harvest routine puts purchasing strategy 
21 (in which the farmer at planting time buys November at-the-money put 
options equal to his expected production) showed a much stronger 
performance in terms of both mean-variance and mean-semi-variance 
analyses than the pre-harvest routine option strategy 23 (in which the 
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farmer at planting time sells November futures to benefit from attractive 
delivery at harvest price and simultaneously purchases at-the-money call 
options on the same futures for ICQ percent of his expected production to 
benefit from any price increase greater than the cost of the call). So, 
the strategy of simultaneous selling of futures and purchasing of 
at-the-money call options on the same futures contracts did not replicate 
the returns of buying puts strategy. Post-harvest option and routine 
storage strategies yielded losses and did not perform better than the 
cash at the harvest market. 
Among the strategies which utilized the hedge ratio(s) derived from 
the price-level model (e.g., strategies 7, 8, and 9), the modified 
price-difference model (e.g., strategies 10, 11, and 12), and the 
price-difference model (e.g., strategy 30), price-level model strategies 
7 through 9 and modified price-difference model strategy 12 showed a 
stronger performance both in terms of mean-variance and semi-variance 
analysis than the modified price-difference strategies 10 and 11, and 
price-level model strategy 30. 
Differences in performance across years was found to exist for the 
various strategies. 
Conclusions 
The results of the simulated hedging strategies provide encouraging 
news for soybean producers who are attempting to lower variance of net 
returns and to increase average net returns. All of the following 
strategies had higher real average returns (higher average returns in 
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1982 dollars) and lower serai-variance (lower mean square loss) of real 
returns than cash at harvest strategy over the entire simulation period, 
1975-85. 
Pre-harvest routine hedging strategy 4: The farmer takes advantage 
of the price improvement that might come from weather developments by 
selling November futures equal to 25 percent of his expected crop in 
mid-March, 25 percent in mid-June, and 25 percent in early August. The 
contracts are offset before expiration and beans are sold on November 1. 
Pre-harvest routine hedging strategies 7 through 9: The farmer 
sells November futures contracts proportional to some percent of his 
expected crop where that proportion is equal to the hedge ratios derived 
from the price-level model (PLM). 
Pre-harvest routine hedging strategy 12: The modified price-
difference model (MPDM) hedge ratio was incorporated into strategy 4 
mentioned above. 
Pre-harvest routine hedging strategies 10 and 11, in which the 
producer sells November futures contracts proportional to 100 percent of 
the expected crop (i.e., strategy 10) and proportional to 75 percent of 
the expected crop (i.e., strategy 11) where the proportions are 
modif.ied-price-difference model (MPDM) hedge ratios both yielded slightly 
lower average real means than the cash strategy and much lower variances 
and semi-variances of the real man than those of the cash strategy. It 
is possible that for some producers the risk reduction potential of 
strategies 10 and 11 worth the cost of the reduced average real returns. 
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All of the pre-harvest selective hedging strategies 13 through 17: 
In strategies 13 through 16, the farmer selectively hedges in November 
futures based on costs of production and hedging costs which send profit 
margin signals for hedging. In strategy 17, the farmer hedges in 
November futures by scaling-up based on costs of production. 
Pre-harvest routine at-the-money put options strategies 18 through 
22: In all of these, the farmer purchases November at-the-money put 
options in raid-March or mid-June for all or some portion of expected 
production. The options are offset (if they have any value) shortly 
before expiration and the beans are sold in the cash market in early 
November. 
Post-harvest selective hedging strategies 31 through 34, and 39: In 
these strategies, the farmer would begin in June of the growing season to 
hedge selectively in March futures all of his expected harvest or 75 
percent of it based on costs of production and carrying cost signals or 
some scaling-up of costs of production and carrying cost signals. 
Pre-harvest routine hedging strategies 5 and 6 in which the farmer 
at planting time sells November futures equal to 100 percent of the 
expected crop (in the case of strategy 5) and sells November futures 
equal to 75 percent of the expected crop (in the case of strategy 6) both 
yielded the same average real returns as the cash at harvest strategy and 
lower serai-variances of the real returns than the cash at the harvest 
strategy. 
The post-harvest routine hedging strategy based on the price 
difference raodel (FDM) hedge ratios (i.e., strategy 30) neither resulted 
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in higher average real returns nor did it yield a lower variance and a 
lower semi-variance of real returns relative to the cash market. 
Post-harvest put options strategies 41 and 42 and routine storage 
strategies had worse performances. Performance of strategies across 
years were different. None of the strategies generated a positive return 
during the 1985 crop year mainly due to low prices and high costs. The 
cash market had the best return in the short crop year of 1983. In other 
years, various strategies yielded different performances. 
Pre-harvest routine hedging strategies 4 through 9 and 12, all of 
the pre-harvest selective hedging strategies 13 through 17, pre-harvest 
option strategies 18 through 22, and selective post-harvest hedging 
strategies 31, 33, and 39 were the best strategies in terms of nominal 
(real) mean-variance (semi-variance) analysis! For example, while the 
cash market resulted in $0.075/bu ($0.205/bu in 1982 dollars) net returns 
over the simulation period, strategy 17 yielded an average return of 
$0.248/bu ($0.431/bu in 1982 dollars) and strategies 31 and 33 resulted 
in average returns of $0,354/bu ($0.483/bu in 1982 dollars) and $0.348/bu 
($0.501/bu in 1982 dollars), respectively, over the same period. 
A difference of $0.278/bu ($0.277/bu in constant dollars) in average 
net return represents a $10,564 per acre ($10,526 per acre in 1982 
dollars) difference in net income between one of the best strategies 
(e.g., strategy 31) and the cash marketing strategy (e.g., strategy 1).^ 
^This difference in net income per acre is based on assumed yield of 
38 bushels per acre which is consistent with the costs of production used 
in the simulation. 
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The findings of this study provide strong support for the use of futures 
markets and pre-harvest at-the-money put options purchases as tools to 
transfer risks to soybean producers in Northcentral Iowa. It also showed 
that certain routine and selective hedging strategies and certain option 
strategies can be useful management techniques in helping soybean 
producers reduce the variability of returns and increase the level of 
these returns. The marketing strategies examined in this study were 
analyzed over an historical period. One might assume that these results 
would also apply in the near future — marketing strategies that have 
been successful in recent history would be expected to continue to be 
successful if similar market behavior persists in the future. However, 
further changes in the soybean industry could affect the market behavior 
and change the relative risk-return trade offs of some marketing 
strategies. 
Profit margins in soybean production could likely become less 
frequent as larger, lower cost, and more sophisticated soybean producers 
arbitrage profit opportunities for themselves. As a result, profit 
opportunities for higher cost producers may occur less frequently. 
Changes in factors which effect supply and demand of soybeans — like 
changes in the interest rate, changes in the government trade policies, 
changes in weather patterns, increased competition from products which 
are close substitutes for soybeans (both soybeans and sunflower seed can 
be used as livestock feed), changes in land prices, changes in government 
production control and price support programs — will affect trend and 
volatility of cash prices which may lead to changes in the relative 
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risk-return trade offs of different marketing strategies. Finally, it 
should be noted that since the patterns of returns of the various 
strategies are not the same, farmers with different risk tolerances will 
have different optimal strategies. 
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APPENDIX A. COMPUTER PROGRAM USED TO CALCULATE OPTION PREMIUMS 
145 
10 REM Taken from Plato (1985, PP.13-14) 
20 REM Note modifications have been made from Plato's program 
30 REM Program for Calculating prices of American Put Options 
40 REM on Commodity Futures Contracts 
50 REM (see 1040 through 1070 for modifying the program to 
60 REM calculate call option prices; see 1080 for modifying 
70 REM the program to calculate European option prices) 
80 REM 
90 DIM PUTT (100), SAVEPUT (100) 
100 OPEN "B:DATA.EXT" FOR INPUT AS #1 
110 CLS ; PRINT 
120 INPUT#1, YR, M, CM, S, K, R, TAU, SIGMA 
130 LPRINT YR, M, CM, S, K 
140 REM 
150 REM Calculate riskless interest rate for one time 
160 REM interval, RR 
170 T = 75 
180 RR = (1!+R)"(TAU/T) 
190 RR = RR-1! 
200 REM 
210 REM Calculate one plus the interest rate of futures price 
220 REM increase, U, and decrease, D, respectively over 
230 REM one time interval 
240 U = EXP(SIGMA*((TAU/T)".5)-.5*(SIGMA)"2*(TAU/T)) 
250 D = EXP(-SIGMA*((TAU/T)".5)-.5*(SIGMA)"2*(TAU/T)) 
260 JJJ = T+1 
270 IX = JJJ-1! 
280 lY = 01 
2 90 REM 
300 REM For loop 330 to 480 calculates all possible put 
310 REM OPTION PRICES ON THE EXPIRATION DATE 
320 REM 
330 FOR I = 1 TO JJJ 
340 RATE = (U"IX)*(D"IY) 
350 PRICE = S*RATE 
360 IF YR<75 THEN LR=225 
370 IF YR=76 THEN LR=250 
380 IF YR=77 THEN LR=350 
390 IF 77<YR<80 THEN LR=450 
400 IF YR>79 THEN LR=502 
410 IF PRICE<LR THEN PRICE=LR 
420 PUTT (I) = K-PRICE 
430 IF PUTT (I)<0 1 THEN PUTT (I) = 01 
440 PRINT PUTT (I), PRICE, RATE, JJJ, I, IX, lY 
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450 lY = IY+1 
460 IX = IX - 1 
470 SAVEPUT (I) = PUTT (I) 
4 80 NEXT I 
4 90 J J <3 ~ JJJ —1 
500 IX = JJJ - 1 
510 lY = 0 
520 PRINT JJJ 
530 REM For loop 550 to 790 calculates all possible put 
535 REM Option 
540 REM Prices for the beginning of the currant time interval 
550 FOR I = 1 TO JJJ 
560 RATE = (U'lX)*(D"IY) 
570 PRICE = S*RATE 
580 II = I+l 
590 REM 
600 REM The following two equations calculate a tentative 
510 REM Option Price and hedge ratio 
620 REM 
630 REM 
640 PUTT (I) = (((1!-D)/(U-D))*SAVEPUT (I) + ((U-1!)/(U-D)) 
645 *SAVEPUT ( 11))/(RR+1!) 
650 H = (SAVEPUT (I) - SAVEPUT (II))/((D-U)*PRICE) 
660 REM Calculate value of exercising immediately 
670 REM 
680 TEST = K-PRICE 
690 REM Put option price equals exercise value when it is 
700 REM greater than or equal to the value calculated in 
710 REM statement 640 
720 IF TEST>=PUTT (I) THEN PUTT (I) = TEST 
730 IF JJJ>10 THEN GOTO 860 
740 PRINT PUTT (I), H, PRICE, I, IX, lY 
750 IF JJJ=1 THEN LPRINT, PRICE, K, PUTT (I), H 
760 SAVEPUT (I) = PUTT (I) 
770 IX = IX-1 
780 lY = IY+1 
7 90 NEXT I 
300 REM 
810 REM If JJJ>1 calculate all possible option prices for the 
820 REM beginning of the previous time interval 
830 REM If JJJ = 1 the program is completed 
835 REM (the option price has 
340 REM been calculated for the beginning of the first 
147 
35(3 REM time interval 
860 IF JJJ>1 THEN GOTO 490 
870 IF NOT EOF(l) THEN 110 
880 END 
390 REM LR=LOAN RATE 
900 REM S = Futures price at the beginning of the first 
905 REM time interval 
910 REM K = Strike or Exercise Price 
920 REM R = Annualized riskless interest rate 
930 REM T = Number of equal time intervals until option 
935 REM expiration date 
940 REM TAU = Fraction of year until option expiration date 
950 REM SIGMA = Standard deviation of the rate of change 
960 REM in the futures price for one year 
970 REM PUTT (I) = Put option prices for the current 
975 REM time interval 
980 REM SAVEPUT (I) = Put option prices for the 
985 REM following time interval 
990 REM JJJ = Number of possible futures prices for 
995 REM the current time interval 
1000 REM IX = Number of futures price increases since 
1010 REM the beginning of the first time interval 
1020 REM lY = Number of futures price decreases since the 
1030 REM beginning of the first time interval 
1040 REM replace statements 420 and 680 with those 
1045 REM shown below to 
1050 REM caculate call option- prices 
1060 REM 320 PUTT (I) = PRICE - K 
1070 REM 580 TEST = PRICE -K 
1080 REM Delete statement 620 to calculate European 
1085 REM Option Prices 
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APPENDIX B. GENERAL REPRESENTATION OF NET RETURNS PER BUSHEL 
EQUATIONS OF VARIOUS STRATEGIES 
149 
Net returns equation for each specific strategy is a simple 
variation of one of the following general equations; 
Net returns per bushel for cash-at-harvest strategy; 
NR = SCP - CP 
where NR = net returns ($/bu), 
SCP = soybean cash price at harvest time, and 
CP = average total costs of production. 
Routine storage strategies 24 and 25 have similar returns equations 
only there we subtract opportunity costs of storing crops, storage costs, 
and production costs from the price at the cash market. 
Net returns per bushel for routine hedging strategy; 
NR = HR * PRP * (F^ - Fg - HC) + (SCP - CP) 
where HR = hedge ratio, and 
PRP = proportion of expected production hedged (if 75 percent of 
expected production is hedged according to a hedge ratio of 
0.9 then HR = 0.9, and PRP = 0.75), 
F^ = futures price at the time that hedge is placed, 
Fg = futures price at the time that hedge is lifted, and 
HC = hedging costs (defined in Chapter 5). 
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Routine hedging strategies 2 through 12, and 26 through 30 have net 
returns equations which are variations of the above equation. 
Net returns per bushel for selective hedging strategy with no scaling 
up: 
SIGNAL = - ESTBAS - HC - CP - PM 
if SIGNAL > 0 then NR = (SCP - CP) + (F^ - Fg - HC) otherwise 
NR = SCP - CP where 
ESTBAS = predicted basis (calculated in Chapter 5), 
PM = profit margin, and 
(F^-ESTBAS) = localized futures price. 
The idea is that starting someday, lets say starting at mid-March, we 
search for a day that gives us positive signal which tells us localized 
futures price has exceeded the production and hedging costs by some 
profit margin. Then we calculate net returns on that day. If we cannot 
find such a day after mid-March, then we do not hedge and we sell the 
crops at cash market at harvest time. 
Selective hedging strategies 13 through 16, and 31 through 38 have 
net returns equations which are variations of above equations. 
Net returns per bushel for selective hedging strategy with scaling up: 
SIGNAL = - ESTBAS - HC - CP. 
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If 0.25 ^ SIGNAL < 0.50 then NRl = (SCP - CP) + (F^ - Fg - HC). 
If 0.50 i SIGNAL < 0.75 then NR2 = (SCP - CP) + (Fj - Fg - HC). 
If 0.75 g SIGNAL < 1.0 then NR3 = (SCP - CP) + (F^ - Fg - HC). 
If SIGNAL a 1.0 then NR4 = (SCP - CP) + (F^ - Fg - HC). 
The idea is that for example the farmer sells November futures equal 
to 25 percent of expected production on the first day after mid-March 
that localized futures price exceeds his production and hedging costs by 
$0.25/bu. He sells additional contracts equal to 25 percent of the 
expected production when localized futures price exceeds production and 
hedging costs by $0.50/bu and the farmer continues scaling up in the same 
way. Futures contracts are offset and beans are sold on cash market at 
harvest. In a marketing year during which the futures price does not 
rally to a level allowing scaling up 100 percent of total estimated 
production by harvest time, the remaining percentage of production is 
assumed to be priced at cash market at harvest. 
Once we calculated NRl through NR4, the net return in each year can 
be calculated. For example, net return in one year can be NR = 0,25(NRl) 
+ 0.25(NR2) + 0.25(NR3) + 0.25(NR4) or it can be NR = 0.50(NR2) + ' 
0.25(NR3) + 0,25(NR4) or it can be NR = 1(SCP - CP) in the case when 
signals are not met and no hedge is made and all crops are sold in 
November (harvest) cash market. 
Net returns for strategies 17, 39, and 40 are calculated in the same 
way as above. 
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Net returns per bushel for put option strategy; 
NRl = (EP - Fg) + (SCP - CP) - PRM - HCl, 
NR2 = SCP - PRM - CP - HC2, 
NR = NRl, if NRl > NR2, otherwise NR = NR2. 
NRl = return when at-the-money put option becomes in-the-money and option 
is exercised, HCl = hedging cost when option is exercised. 
NR2 = return when option is let expire, HC2 = hedging costs when option 
is not exercised, PRM = option's premium, EP = option's exercise 
price. 
Option strategies 18 through 22 and 41 through 42 have net returns 
equations which are variations of previous equations. 
Net returns per bushel for strategy of selling November futures and 
simultaneously purchasing at-the-money call options on the same futures 
contracts for 100 percent of expected production (strategy 23): 
NRl = (F^ - Basis) + (F^ - EP) - PRM - HCl - HC2 - CP, 
NR2 = (F^ - Basis) - PRM - HCl - HC2 - CP, 
NR = NRl if NRl > NR2 otherwise NR = NR2. 
where NRl = net 
NR2 = net 
NR = net 
returns per bushel 
returns per bushel 
returns per bushel 
when the call is 
when the call is 
in this strategy 
exercised, 
not exercised, 
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Basis = (Fg - Sg) where Fg is futures price at the time hedge is 
lifted and is the cash market price at harvest, 
PRM = option premium, 
EP = exercise price, 
(F^-EP) = can be positive or negative (this is due to the fact that we 
consider nearest at-the-money calls), 
HCl = opportunity costs of futures margins and brokerage fee for 
futures, 
HC2 = options brokerage fee and opportunity costs of premium, and 
CP = production costs. 
Note that in the case of post-harvest strategies we have to subtract from 
the net return equation(s) the opportunity costs of storing crop and 
storage costs. 
